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APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT STATE 
ACTION EXEMPTION TO MUNICIPAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: A CASE FOR 
BROADER LOCAL DISCRETION 
Ross J. Hamlin* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although "The Sherman Act! was instituted in 1890 in an at-
tempt to rid the nation of private trusts and other pervasive 
corporate combinations2 that prevented free competition,"3 courts 
have held that state agencies4 and municipalities5 may also sue 
and be subject to suit under the Act. In response to recent Sher-
man Act attack, municipalities have asserted that they are 
exempt from regulation by the statute. Recent decisions, how-
ever, have severely limited a municipality's access to the normal 
Sherman Act exemptions. For example, in a recent Supreme 
Court case,6 the City of Boulder's attempt to place a moratorium 
on cable TV development was disallowed under the Sherman 
Act.7 The city defended the suit claiming a state action exemption 
existed for their activities due to the state's home rule amend-
ment.8 The Supreme Court, however, in deciding the case, nar-
rowed the exemption to such an extent that the city could not 
* Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). 
2. See infra text and notes at notes 117-20. 
3. See infra text and notes at notes 117-20. 
4. See infra text and notes at notes 179-261. 
5. See infra text and notes at notes 261-313. 
6. Community Communications Co., 455 U.S. 40 (1982); see infra text and notes at 
notes 145-71. 
7. See infra text and notes at notes 283-313. 
8. See infra text and notes at notes 283-313. 
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meet the new standards and was held to be included within the 
scope of the statute.9 
In the area of environmental regulation, the potential unavail-
ability to local governments of the Sherman Act exemptions ap-
pears to create significant problems.lO For example, in response to 
a serious shortage of waste disposal sites, the City of Akron, Ohio, 
implemented a monopolistic solid waste disposal program.H The 
city developed an ambitious plan to build a disposal plant which 
would also supply much-needed energy to local industryP In 
order to guarantee a sufficient supply of fuel, the city passed a 
regulation requiring that all waste be disposed of at the municipal 
plant.13 This regulation was challenged under the Sherman Act as 
an unreasonable restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize 
the industry.14 The city defended, arguing that it was exempt 
from the application of the Act15 due to the presence of state 
action.1s Mter the district court17 and the circuit court18 decided in 
favor of Akron, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that stricter requirements than those used by the lower 
courts had to be met to obtain the exemption.19 Although on 
remand, the district court again found for the city,20 the judicial 
fate of this project is still uncertain as of this writing. 
In an effort to clarify and address some of the issues raised in 
the Akron case, this article will consider whether it is appropriate 
to place antitrust limitations on municipalities, particularly when 
the city is responding to critical environmental problems such as 
solid waste disposal. First, the article will briefly examine the case 
of Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron,21 the ongoing case discussed 
9. See infra text and notes at notes 283-313. 
11. See infra text and notes at notes 22-59. 
12. See infra text and notes at notes 22-59. 
13. See infra text and notes at notes 22-59. 
14. See infra text and notes at notes 121-40. 
15. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron, Glenwillow Landfill Inc. v. Akron, 485 F. Supp. 
671 (E.n. Ohio 1979), aff'd sub nom. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 
(6th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). The Hybud and Glenwillaw 
cases were consolidated at the district court level. 
16. See infra text and notes at notes 313-80. 
17. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 684. 
18. Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1197. 
19. 455 U.S. at 931. The Court vacated and remanded Hybud for examination under 
the stricter standards for state action exemption as defined by the Court in Community 
Communications, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See infra text and notes at notes 283-313. 
20. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. ~ 65,356 (1982). The case is 
currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. 
21. Hybud, 654 F.2d 1187 (1981), aff'd Hybud, 485 F. Supp. 671 (1979). 
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above, which clearly depicts the solid waste problems faced by 
cities today, and considers the approach one city took to solve the 
problem. Second, this article will describe the specific statutory 
law relevant to the Ohio case. This section will examine, in par-
ticular, the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, the creation of the 
Ohio Water Development Authority and its resulting respon-
sibilities, and the doctrine of municipal home rule in Ohio. Third, 
this article will analyze in some detail the powers and the lim-
itations of the Sherman Act; particular emphasis will be placed on 
the exemptions to the Act, including statutory immunity, implied 
exemption, and the exemption for government approved transac-
tions, the so-called state action exemption. Fourth, this article will 
examine, in detail, the litigation challenging the Akron plan. Fi-
nally, a proposal for a statutory exemption from the Sherman Act 
for solid waste disposal will be presented. 
II. AKRON AND THE SOUD WASTE DISPOSAL PROBLEM 
Like many cities in the United States, Akron, Ohio faced a 
significant solid waste disposal problem during the 1960s and 
1970s.22 The city was running out of dump space and regulations 
prevented the creation of new dumpsites. Akron chose to solve its 
disposal problem by creating a waste incineration/energy recy-
cling system. The program, however, was attacked on antitrust 
grounds in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron.23 While the final 
result of this litigation is as yet unknown, the potential impact of 
such suits on solid waste disposal and other municipal programs 
with monopolistic effects can be extremely significant. Thus, the 
Akron case warrants close examination. 
A. Factual Background 
In the late 1960s Akron officials recognized the impending need 
for a new solid waste disposal system.24 The problem became 
apparent for three reasons: first, between the years 1950 and 
1970, six of Akron's seven solid waste landfill sites were closed 
because they had reached capacity levels;25 second, the last solid 
22. 485 F. Supp. at 692, 693, 694, 695, Appendix C, Stipulations B4-11, C-12. 
23. Hybud, 654 F.2d 1187 (1981), afJ'd Hybud, 485 F. Supp. 671 (1979). 
24. 485 F. Supp. at 686, Appendix A, Stipulations 19, 20. 
25. Id. at 6, Appendix A, Stipulation 19. 
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waste landfill site was also approaching capacity;26 and third, the 
possibility of opening another landfill site had been severely lim-
ited by an Ohio statute27 which requires compliance with highly 
detailed licensing, monitoring, and performance standards.28 
In an effort to solve the impending disposal problem, Akron 
contracted with its City Planning Department to carry out a 
regional study and to recommend solutions to the solid waste 
problem.29 The study examined 102 potential landfill sites.30 All 
but seven were deemed unsuitable for solid waste disposal.31 The 
Planning Department did, however, indicate that a solid waste 
incineration program might be possible.32 Interest in the program 
grew, and in 1969 the city hired a consulting firm to develop a solid 
waste incineration plan.33 Although the consulting report indi-
cated that the technology necessary to build an energy recycling 
system existed,34 the city determined that the project, at that 
time, was economically unfeasible.35 
Meanwhile, the last permanent Akron landfill site had reached 
capacity.36 After much litigation,37 the city established a tempo-
rary site in June of 1970.38 This new site provided adequate dis-
posal of the city's solid waste for several years. However, the 
increasing supply of refuse39 and the space limitation at the tem-
26. Id. at 686, Appendix A, Stipulation 19(2). 
27. Id. at 686, Appendix A, Stipulation 19(1). 
28. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.01-.99 (Baldwin 1982). 
29. 485 F. Supp. at 686, Appendix A, Stipulation 21. 
30. Id. at 693, Appendix C, Stipulation 7. 
31. Id. at 686, Appendix A, Stipulation 21. 
32. I d. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulations 23, 24. 
33. Id. at 693, Appendix C, Stipulation 24. 
34. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 25. 
35. Id. at 693, Appendix C, Stipulation 30. 
36. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 25. 
37. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 25. 
38. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulations 25, 26. 
39. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 26. The following chart illustrates the dramatic 
increase in solid waste production which occurred in Akron in the 1970's: 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 26. 
Garbage Tons 
79,000 
70,988 
101,958 
164,325 
239,900 
239,399 
272,273 
284,122 
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porary site prompted the County Board of Health to institute 
successful litigation in 1975 to revoke the license of the new 
landfill site,40 again leaving the city without a proper disposal 
10cation.41 In 1978, however, the city successfully annexed the site 
property and contiguous land, thus enabling the site to continue 
in operation.42 Throughout this period the city was aware that 
landfill was a temporary solution,43 so Akron turned again to the 
recycling energy system proposal.44 
While the city was examining its various alternatives, Ohio 
Edison, which provides electrical power to the citizens of Ohio, 
petitioned the Ohio Public Utilities Commission for the right to 
abandon its steam generation operation in Akron.45 Because of its 
need for steam generation and its lack of solid waste disposal 
sites, the City of Akron seized this opportunity to move ahead 
with the recycling energy system as a means of disposing of solid 
waste and of providing steam to local industry.46 
To obtain funds for the recycling system the city approached 
the Ohio Water Development Authority (OWDA)47 for financial 
assistance.48 The OWDA agreed to finance the project using 
Dillon-Reed, an investment banking house, as the underwriters.49 
The OWDA, however, required three guarantees from the city 
before it would co-underwrite the financing: (1) a sufficient sale-
able energy output over the term of the bonds to assure repay-
ment;50 (2) long term agreements locking in the steam pur-
chasers;51 and (3) a $10 million fund to cover construction cost 
overruns.52 
Once this issue was settled, Akron instituted, under its home 
40. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 26. 
41. Id. at 687, Appendix A, Stipulation 26. 
42. Id. at 687, 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 26. 
43. Id. at 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 29. 
44. Id. at 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 30. 
45. Id. at 688, Apendix A, Stipulation 28. The request was ultimately denied. 
46. Id. at 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 30. 
47. For a discussion of the responsibilities of the OWDA, see infra text and notes at 
notes 97-103. 
48. For a discussion of the financing arrangements see infra text and notes at notes 
47-52. 
49. 485 F. Supp. at 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 33. 
50. Id. at 688, Appendix A, Stipulation 32. 
51. Id. at 689, Appendix A, Stipulation 34(1). 
52. Id. at 689, Appendix A, Stipulation 34(2). 
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rule power,53 a revised solid waste collection and disposal licensing 
ordinance54 to assure a supply of solid waste sufficient to generate 
the required amount of energy. The effect of the ordinance was to: 
1. require all licensees to dispose of all collected solid waste at 
the recycling energy faeility;55 
2. require all licensees to pay a dumping fee to dump their 
loads;56 
3. prevent all licensees from taking any solid waste to any 
private or public disposal facilities outside the city;57 and 
53. The home rule power was granted by Omo CONST. art XVIII, § 7, proposed and 
accepted in 1912; see infra text and notes at notes 104-16. 
54. The ordinance states: 
Whereas, in connection with the financing of the City's recycle energy facility, it 
is necessary to provide for revised service charges for the collection and disposal 
of garbage and rubbish and to revise licensing provisions to require that gar-
bage and rubbish collected by private haulers be disposed of at the new facility 
when completed. 
City of Akron Ordinance 841-76, reprinted in 485 F. Supp. at 691-92. Section l(a) of the 
ordinance amends § 850.06 of the codified ordinance as follows: 
Until such time as the City's recycle energy plant begins accepting rubbish for 
disposal, no rubbish shall be deposited by the holder of a rubbish hauler's license 
within the corporate limits of the City except at a place designated in writing by 
the Mayor. From and after the date on which such plant begins accepting 
rubbish for disposal, all rubbish collected within the corporate limits of the City 
by a holder of a rubbish hauler's license shall be deposited at such plant; 
provided that rubbish which is not acceptable for disposal by such plant shall 
not be deposited within the City except at a place designated in writing by the 
Mayor. 
ld. Section 2 of the Ordinance states: 
No person, except duly authorized collectors of the City or private haulers 
licensed pursuant to law, shall collect or remove any garbage or rubbish ac-
cumulating within the City or use the streets, avenues and alleys of the City for 
the purpose of collecting or transporting the same. All licenses granting to such 
private haulers and all contracts or other forms of authorization of duly au-
thorized collectors shall require that all garbage or rubbish collected and trans-
ported under authority for disposal by the City's energy plant, be disposed by 
the City's energy plant, be disposed of at such plant from and after the date on 
which such plant begins accepting garbage and rubbish for disposal. 
ld. Section 3 of the Ordinance establishes a collection and disposal fee for garbage and 
rubbish generated within the City's limits during the calendar year 1978. Section 3 also 
provides that: 
ld. 
The Director of Public Service is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations 
for the collection of said service charge and he is further authorized with 
consent of Council to adjust such charge upward on January 1, 1979 or on 
January 1 of any year thereafter. 
55. ld. at 692, Appendix A, Stipulation 45. 
56. ld. at 692, Appendix A, Stipulation 45. 
57. ld. at 692, Appendix A, Stipulation 42. 
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4. prevent all licensees from separating out any materials for 
the purpose of keeping those materials from the recycling 
energy plant.58 
This ordinance was the subject of the antitrust litigation that 
was to ensue.59 In order to fully understand the actions taken by 
the city, as well as the legal challenges which the city faced as a 
result of its actions, the next section will examine the applicable 
law in place at the time the ordinance was passed. 
III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
The previous section described some of the unique policy issues 
facing the City of Akron. The actions taken by the city, however, 
resulted not just from policy issues, but from a body of state and 
federal law as well, which also helped to determine the options 
available to Akron. First examined will be the federal Solid Waste 
Disposal Act,60 which established the federal solid waste disposal 
program now in place. Next examined will be the Ohio statutes 
creating the Ohio Water Development Authority,61 the body re-
sponsible for the creation, regulation, and financing of Ohio's 
waste disposal programs. Lastly, a general overview of home rule 
provisions is presented since Akron used the home rule powers 
granted by the Ohio Constitution to implement its waste disposal 
program.62 
A. The Solid Waste Disposal Act: A National Problem Requiring 
Local Solutions 
Congressional concern over the nation's solid waste disposal 
problem led to the passage of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 
1965.63 Congress hoped that the Act would provide states with the 
power and the impetus necessary to solve the solid waste problem 
using creative local solutions. That Congress intended the Act to 
be widely applied to local problems is indicated by the statute's 
broad definition of waste as, 
58. Id. at 692, Appendix A, Stipulation 48. 
59. See infra text and notes at notes 313-80 for a discussion of the Hybud litigation. 
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see infra text and notes at notes 
63-96. 
61. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 6123.01 (Baldwin 1982); see infra text and notes at notes 
97-103. 
62. Omo CaNST. art. XVIII, § 7; see infra text and notes at notes 104-116. 
63. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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any garbage, refuse, sludge ... and other discarded material, 
including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous mate-
rial resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and ag-
ricultural operations, and from community activities.64 
Congress made a series of findings concerning solid waste. 
First, the amount of solid waste is constantly increasing.65 This 
increase has created "serious financial, management, inter-
governmental, and technical" solid waste disposal problems in 
expanding urban areas.66 Second, Congress determined that al-
though collection and disposal of solid waste should continue to be 
primarily a function of the state, regional, and local agencies, the 
problem is national in scope. Federal action is therefore necessary 
to provide financial and technical assistance and to improve 
methods of dealing with local solid waste disposa1.67 Third, it was 
found that "alternatives to existing methods of land disposal must 
be developed since many of the cities in the United States will be 
running out of suitable solid waste disposal sites within five years 
unless immediate action is taken,"68 resulting in the health and 
safety dangers inherent in continuing to dispose of solid waste in 
landfills.69 Fourth, Congress determined that "millions of tons of 
recoverable material ... are needlessly buried each year."70 Much 
of this waste "represents a potential source of solid fuel, oil, or gas 
that can be converted into energy,"71 thereby reducing American 
dependence on foreign resources and shrinking the deficit in the 
balance of payments.72 These findings, coupled with a general 
concern over energy shortages, led Congress to view solid waste 
as a viable potential energy source,73 and recommended the pos-
sible use of solid waste as recoverable energy producing mate-
riaL74 In the Solid Waste Disposal Act, therefore, Congress pro-
posed that various forms of resource recovery facilities and sys-
tems be examined.75 The statute treats these systems as a poten-
64. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(1), 6901(a)(2) (1976). 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(3) (1976). 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1976). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(6) (1976). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(c)(1) (1976). 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2) (1976). 
71. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d)(1) (1976). 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(c)(3) (1976). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d)(2) (1976). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d)(3) (1976). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(1)-6902(8) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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tial energy source as well as a feasible solution to the solid waste 
disposal problem.76 
The major objective of the Solid Waste Disposal Act is to assist 
in the development of solid waste disposal plans, and to encourage 
the use of effective methods of solid waste disposal in the local 
marketplace. The statute does not require the formation of a state 
plan or adherence to any federal scheme.77 Rather, the statute 
requires that if federal solid waste funds are desired by the state, 
then the state must implement disposal plans which will meet 
standards no less stringent than federal standards.78 It is the 
responsibility of any state choosing to implement a waste disposal 
plan to follow the federal guidelines as they are adapted to local 
conditions, and to enforce the guidelines promulgated under the 
state plan.79 There is no penalty for failure to implement a state 
plan or for implementing a state plan which does not meet federal 
standards. The only adverse consequence of non-implementation 
is the refusal of federal financial assistance if requested by the 
state. 
Should the state decide to promulgate a plan, the Act states 
that the plan should be "designed to foster cooperation among 
federal, state, and local governments and private industry."80 The 
means of fostering cooperation may take the form of intermunici-
pal81 or interstate82 agencies. Each agency would have the power 
and responsibility to carry out the state or regional solid waste 
plan.83 In designing the cooperative or individual disposal plan, 
the government agency must consider the unique factors of each 
marketplace.84 These factors include geological and hydrological 
conditions,85 type of waste to be disposed of,86 political, organiza-
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(23)-6903(24) (1976). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 6947 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6943 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 6941 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
81. An "intermunicipal agency" is defined by the statute as, "an agency established by 
two or more municipalities with responsibility for planning or administration of solid 
waste." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(9) (1976). 
82. The statute defines an "interstate agency" as, "an agency of two or more munici-
palities in different States, or an agency established by two or more States, with author-
ity to provide for the management of solid waste and serving two or more municipalities 
located in different States." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(10) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6904 (1976). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6942 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(cX2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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tional and financial problems,87 population factors,88 and types of 
resource recovery facilities which may produce marketable 
energy.89 
As it applies to energy development, the statute requires that 
the plan fully examine the economic and technical aspects of any 
resource recovery program.90 The disposal program offered must 
analyze such issues as market opportunities for energy recovered 
from municipal waste,91 cost comparisons between fossil fuel and 
resource recovery,92 transportation and storage feasibility analy-
ses,93 conservation effects,94 and cost-benefit comparisons be-
tween recovery and disposal.95 The final requirement is that the 
state plan must assist municipalities in their efforts to recover 
energy and materials from municipal waste.96 
Overall, the federal regulations indicate the direction in which 
the states should travel, but they do not mandate the particular 
routes the states must follow. Each state is left to its own creativ-
ity in applying the federal standards to its local problems. This 
article now turns to an examination of how one state, Ohio, at-
tempted to meet the federal standards with local statutes. 
B. The Ohio Water Development Authority: One State's Response 
To a National Concern 
The Ohio Water Development Authority (OWDA) was initially 
established to regulate waste water facilities.97 Pursuant to the 
Federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, however, the scope of OWDA 
authority was expanded in 1980 to include management of the 
state's solid waste programs.98 The OWDA was given responsibil-
ity for providing such financial and other state assistance as may 
be needed by Ohio localities attempting to implement new waste 
disposal programs. 
87. 42 u.s.c. § 6942(cX9) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6942(cX4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
89. 42 u.S.C. § 6942(cX10)-6942(cXll) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
90. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(cXbXA) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
91. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(cXbX2XA) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
92. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(cXbX2XB) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6943(c)(b)(2)(C), 6943(2)(F) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
94. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(cXbX2)(D) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
95. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(cXbX2XE) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
96. 42 u.S.C. § 6943(c)(b)(C) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
97. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 6121.03 (Baldwin 1982). This section was the original Ohio 
Water Development Authority (OWDA) enabling statute. 
98. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 6123.03 (Baldwin 1982). 
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The most significant new responsibility of the OWDA was work-
ing with local governments in the creation of facilities for develop-
ing energy resources from solid waste.99 An energy resource de-
velopment facility is defined by the Ohio statute as "any energy 
resource development, research or conservation facility, includ-
ing pilot as well as demonstration facilities"l°O that recycles solid 
waste for use in the production of energy.101 It was this type of 
facility that Akron viewed as a possible solution to its solid waste 
disposal problem which, in addition, would also serve as an energy 
production facility, thereby qualifying for federal aid under the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act.102 Akron contacted the OWDA and 
proposed building a resource recovery facility to be created under 
the combined powers of the OWDA and Akron's home rule 
power.1OO The next section will address home rule in general as 
well as the home rule powers available to the City of Akron. 
c. Municipal Home Rule 
In its broadest terms "municipal home rule means the power of 
local self-government."l04 States grant home rule powers in order 
to give local communities power over matters that uniquely affect 
the citizens of the locality. lOS The sphere of power, however, is 
limited to matters of local concern since issues that affect all the 
99. Section 6123.031 states, "the OWDA may exercise the powers set forth in this 
chapter ... for the purpose of constructing or providing financial assistance for the 
construction of any energy resource development facilities." Omo REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 6123.031 (Baldwin 1982). Interestingly, the state created the OWDA pursuant to a state 
constitutional amendment which determined that solid waste disposal and/or recycling 
is in the public interest and is a legitimate public end. Ohio Constitution Article VIII § 13 
states: 
To dispose of solid waste, it is hereby determined to be in the public interest and 
a proper public purpose ... for agencies ... to ... construct ... and issue bonds ... 
to provide moneys ... for the construction ... of such facilities. 
Except for facilities for ... solid waste disposal ... no lending of aid or credit 
shall be made ... for facilities to be constructed for the purpose of providing 
electric or gas utility service to the public. 
Omo CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
100. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1551.01 (Baldwin 1982). 
101. Since the Ohio definition is somewhat vague, the federal definition may be useful. 
The federal statute defines a resource recovery facility as a "facility at which solid waste 
is processed for the purpose of extracting, converting to energy, or otherwise separating 
and preparing solid waste for reuse." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(24) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
102. See supra text and notes at notes 24-59. 
103. See supra text and notes at notes 24-59. 
104. E. MCQUILUN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.41 (3rd ed. 1979). 
105. Id. at § 1.40. 
620 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 11:609 
inhabitants of the state are viewed as state problems, subject to 
state control.l06 
Once the home rule powers of a municipality are authorized,107 
the city's power may still be subject to limitation. In Ohio, the 
home rule amendment, adopted in 1912, authorizes the city to act 
on local matters; and it may act on these matters as long as its 
actions are not in conflict with state laws. lOS "Local," however, is a 
misleading term. In the Ohio amendment, "local" means matters 
of a purely local nature;l09 yet some matters which would appear 
to be local have been held to be of a statewide concern.110 On the 
other hand, a city in Ohio may regulate some matters which 
extend far beyond the city's geographic boundaries-for example, 
a city may acquire a public utility111 whose service area extends 
outside its corporate limits of the city.ll2 ~hus, "local" is a vague 
concept as used in the amendment, and its boundaries must be 
defined issue by issue rather than by general definition.113 
A city which has been granted home rule powers is still subject 
to the decisions of the state legislature and may therefore be 
106. [d. 
107. Authorization takes two general forms: the self-executing and the permissive 
home rule models. Van Landingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 269 (1968). Permissive home rule power requires an act of the state 
legislature to grant to the cities the power delineated in the state constitution. For 
example, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized home rule in the state but waited 27 
years before granting the home rule power to the cities. Conversely, the Ohio home rule 
provision is an example of a self-executing model as it grants the home rule power within 
the constitutional amendment itself; "Municipalities shall have the authority to exercise 
all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local 
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." 
Omo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. Overall, each home rule model implements the home rule 
power in a different way, but the outcome is the same: the municipality involved is 
granted the power to promulgate local regulations which are not in conflict with the 
general laws of the state. 
108. Omo CoNST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
109. Eg. Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 385-86, 124 N.E. 212, 214-15 (1919) 
(vehicle load weight); Young v. Dayton" 12 Ohio St. 2d 71, 232 N.E.2d. 655 (1967) (munici-
pal property conveyances). 
110. E.g., Foltz v. Dayton, 22 Ohio Misc. 27, 32-34, 254 N.E.2d 395 (1969) (municipal civil 
service salaries are a matter of statewide concern). 
111. Omo CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 states: "Any municipality may acquire ... within or 
without its corporate limits, any public utility the products or service of which is or is to 
be supplied to the municipality." 
112. E.g. Village of Blue Ash v. Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 347-48, 182 N.E.2d 557, 
559-60 (1962) (condemned land outside corporate limits for construction of airport). 
113. E. MCQUILUN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 1.41 (3rd ed. 1978). 
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preempted by that body.u4 Furthermore, a city attempting to 
regulate a local problem may run afoul of federal statutes and will 
similarly be preempted. Thus, a city exercising its home rule 
authority in an attempt to respond, for example, to a solid waste 
disposal problem, may find that the actions taken are inconsistent 
with another state or federal legislative act and will, therefore, be 
nullified as being in conflict with the "generallaws."u5 
Akron's solid waste disposal plan, taken pursuant to its home 
rule power, could theoretically be challenged as running afoul of 
state or federal statutes or activities in this area. Since no action 
was taken by the state, it appeared that the waste disposal prob-
lem was a local matter within the sphere of the city's power to 
regulate. As the Hybud litigation indicated,u6 however, the waste 
disposal ordinance arguably conflicts with the federal laws, spe-
cifically the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
IV. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
In 1890, Senator Sherman proposed the Sherman Act in re-
sponse to the growing public outcry that Congress should use its 
power to curb the proliferation of trustS.ll7 Trusts, such as the 
infamous railroad trusts, were designed to control the relevant 
marketplace by setting prices and production quotas at levels 
approved by inter-company stock voting trusts. us Congress saw 
114. See Columbus v. Glasscock, 117 Ohio App. 63, 64; 189 N.E.2d 889, 890 (1962) (local 
police regulations are a matter of local concern and do not conflict with general laws such 
that they may be preempted). 
115. See supra text and notes at notes 104-14. 
116. See infra text and notes at notes 313-80 for a discussion of the Hybud case. 
117. E.g. Lovinger, Antitrust Means Economic Freedom, in HOFFMAN'S ANTITRUST 
LAW AND TECHNIQUES 143, 144 (M. Hoffman & A. Winard eds. 1963). 
118. A statement made almost one hundred years ago by Senator Turpie of Indiana 
illustrates the 1889 definition of a trust: 
Mr. President, a trust, in the most recent acceptation of the term, is a union or 
combination, rarely of individuals, usually of corporations, dealing in or produc-
ing a certain commodity, of the total amount of which belonging to them a 
common stock is made with the intention of holding and selling the same at an 
enhanced price, by suppressing or limiting the supply and by other devices, so 
that the price of such trust commodity shall depend merely upon the agreement 
made about it by those in the combination, without reference to the cost of its 
production, the quantity of the article held for consumption, or the demand 
therefore among buyers. 
The act of fixing the price of the commodity the ultimate result of this 
confederated association, and sometimes the handling of its goods and funds, 
are intrusted to one or more persons, called the syndicate, or executive commit-
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these trusts as more than just an isolated practice. The market 
control to which the trust gave rise was viewed as a threat to the 
underpinnings of an economic system based on a competitive 
marketplace.u9 Congress, therefore, did not design the statutory 
scheme solely to control any particular trust; rather, it crafted the 
statute with a broad enough brush that courts of the future could 
limit any type of market control which might arise.120 
A. The Sherman Act Sections One and Two 
Section one of the Sherman Act121 provides that "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or 
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegaL"122 The sec-
tion imposes criminal liability where three elements are pres-
tee, from which intrusting the scheme takes its name. The ultimate fixing of a 
price upon the common stock is done without the least consideration of any 
legitimate element either of a sale or purchase in the open market, and depends 
for its efficiency not upon any law or known rule of trade or commerce, but only 
upon the binding force, tenor, .mel tension of the trust agreement. 
21 Congo Rec. 137 (1889). 
119. The threat was described eloquently by Senator Jones during the Sherman Act 
debates: 
The growth of these commercial monsters called trusts in the last few years has 
become appalling .... Now, however, having been allowed to grow and fatten 
upon the greed and conscienceless rapacity of commercial sharks until in schools 
they are found now in every branch of trade, preying upon every industry, and 
by their unholy combinations robbing their victims, the general public, in de-
fiance of every principle of law or morals . . .. There is scarcely an article of 
commerce which is not now or soon to be controlled by some combination of 
plunderers." 
20 Congo Rec. 1457-58 (1889). 
120. Parker V. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1945). In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, 
the Act was designed to serve "as a charter of freedom (and) has a generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." 
Appalachian Coals Inc. V. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). 
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. 1979). 
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1 states in full: 
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or 
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one 
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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ent: l23 first, the trade affected must be in interstate or foreign 
commerce;l24 second, there must be either a contract,125 a "combi-
nation,"l26 or a conspiracy;l27 third, the contract, combination, or 
conspiracy must be in restraint of trade.l28 If the plaintiff proves 
that these three elements are present, section one of the Act 
imposes significant criminal penalties. The penalties provided in-
clude a fine of up to $1 million for corporations and up to $100 
thousand for individuals,129 imprisonment of up to three years, or 
both a fine and imprisonment.l30 
While section one addresses restraint of trade, section two of 
the Act provides for the regulation of trade monopolization. Sec-
tion two states that "every person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other per-
son or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce 
among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony."l3l 
123. Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72,81 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). 
124. E.g. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 484 (1940); Hospital Building Co. v. 
Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 743-46 (1976). 
125. A contract is currently defined broadly by the courts as a binding agreement 
between two or more parties. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 
945, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1972); see also Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 
1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). 
126. A "combination" is defined as "a union or association of 2 or more persons for the 
achieving of a common object." Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 
945, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (citing Northern Securities Corp. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 
(1904)); see also Hester v. Martindale-Hubbel, 493 F. Supp. 335, 338-39 (E.D. N.Car. 1980). 
127. A "conspiracy" is defined as "a joint undertaking extending over a period of time 
with a common purpose, intent or design resulting from a combination or agreement, 
express or implied, to accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by an 
unlawful means." Pearl Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 950. See 
also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-10 (1946). 
128. An action in restraint of trade is seen as an action that impedes the natural flow 
of commerce. United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106, 179-81 (1911). 
See also Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 
609-10 (1914) (restraint of trade is an obstruction of the due course of trade). 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982) states: "The word 'person' or 'persons' ... shall be deemed to 
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either 
the United States, the laws of any of the territories, the laws of any state, or the law of 
any foreign country." 
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2 states in full: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one 
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The statute imposes criminal penalties for the three distinct of-
fenses outlined in section tWOjl32 actual monopolization,133 at-
tempts to monopolize,t34 and combining or conspiring to 
monopolize.l35 The criminal sanctions imposed in section two are 
identical to those imposed in section one.l36 
The key component of section two is the concept of monopoliza-
tion,t37 and the manner in which the courts define that concept is 
therefore of significant consequence. The current definition of the 
term "monopolize" is the creation of a system that "interferes 
with the natural flow of interstate commerce" by control of prices 
or competition,l38 regardless of whether "the tendency is a creep-
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). 
132. Although all three offenses can be found at trial, punishment for more than one 
raises double jeopardy issues. The Supreme Court addressed this problem in American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), holding that attempts to monopolize 
will be merged into actual monopolization. The Court held, however, that a party may be 
found guilty of two different sections of the act and sentenced on both without violating 
the double jeopardy rules. [d. at 787-89. See also United States v. American Honda Motor 
Co., 271 F. Supp. 979, 986 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (one cannot fragment claims to avoid § 6). 
133. Actual monopolization requires the existence of two elements: (1) monopoly 
power in the relevant market; and (2) the intent and purpose to exercise that power. The 
key test of the section is defining monopoly power. The Supreme Court has stated that 
monopoly power exists when a company can raise prices in the market or exclude 
competition from the market when it desires to do so. American Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781,811 (1946). See also United States v. Aluminum Company of Amer-
ica, 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.). 
134. Attempt to monopolize has been defined as "the employment of methods, means 
and practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though 
falling short, nevertheless approaches so close as to create a dangerous probability of it 
... " American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946). 
135. See supra text and notes at notes 126-27 for a discussion of the required standards 
to show a combination or conspiracy under the Sherman Act. In addition, under § 2, the 
conspiracy must actually exist, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 
809-10 (1946); there must be overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose, id. at 809; a 
substantial amount of commerce must be affected, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 
U.S. 218, 225 (1947); and there must be a specific intent to monopolize, Times-Picayune 
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626-27 (1953). 
136. See supra note 131 for the full text of § 2. 
137. At early common law, a monopoly was merely a special privilege granted by the 
state. W. Dana, Monopoly under the National Antitrust Act, 7 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1894). 
See also United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956) (citing 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911». 
138. E.g. Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1958). See also, Berkey 
Photo Inc. v. Eastman-Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093; 
Columbia Metal Culvert Co., Inc. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20 
(1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978). 
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ing one rather than one that proceeds at a full gallop."l39 This 
broad definition of monopolize clearly carries out the drafters 
original intention that the Sherman Act be broadly defined to 
ensure free and unfettered competition in the marketplace.l40 
The Sherman Act is an inclusive statute. As such, every anti-
competitive activity is held to violate the Act unless the action is 
shown to be exempt from the Act's application. In some cases, the 
only way a party may escape Sherman Act liability is the success-
ful use of an exemption from the Act. Those exemptions will now 
be examined. 
B. Sherman Act Exemptions 
Any unreasonable restraint of trade, no matter what its source, 
may be held to violate the Sherman Act.141 Certain anticompeti-
tive restraints, however, may be exempt from Sherman Act appli-
cation.142 An action that is exempt may be said to be free of the 
general application of the Sherman Act, or, in the language of the 
Supreme Court, "disinfected from the strictures of the antitrust 
139. E.g. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
140. See supra note 119; text and note at note 120. 
141. If read literally, the Sherman Act could proscribe every restraint of trade no 
matter how reasonable. This would prohibit, in essence, every contract between parties 
that was an exclusive arrangement. After a few years of early confusion, the Supreme 
Court, in Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was given the opportunity to 
establish Sherman Act analysis, referred to as the rule of reason. This rule states that 
the Sherman Act only proscribes unreasonable restraints of trade. Six years later, the 
specific standards to be examined were defined by the Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917). 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed merely regulates, and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To answer that question, the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; and the nature of the 
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, and the purpose 
or end sought, are all relevant facts. 
Id. at 238. 
The rule of reason analysis can, however, be precluded by a court's finding a per se 
violation. Per se violations were recognized because the judiciary felt that there were 
some anticompetitive activities that were so pernicious as to be declared per se illegal 
regardless of the merits of the restraint. Included in this category are price fixing, tying 
arrangements, group boycotts, horizontal market divisions and vertical market divi-
sions. 
142. See infra text and notes at notes 153-312. 
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laws."l43 The exemption of an action does not cure the violation of 
the Sherman Act. Rather, the restraint is a violation but the 
Sherman Act is unable to reach the action due to the protective 
cloak of immunity.l44 
There are three general categories of exemptions;l45 statu-
tory,t46 implied,t47 and government approved actions,148 The 
exemptions created may be quite broad and offer a blanket im-
munity for a class of actions;149 or the exemption may be limited to 
application in specific circumstances.150 When a defendant claims 
an exemption, the claim is filed as an affirmative defense.151 The 
party claiming immunity bears the burden of proving that the 
standards for application of the exemption are fully satisfied. If 
the party fails to do so, the exemption will not apply.152 
143. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Pub-
lishers, 337 F. Supp. 394, 400 (S.D. N.Y. 1972) (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 
U.S. 341 (1963». 
144. For example, the state action exemption simply shields the anticompetitive ac-
tion from Sherman Act application. See infra text and notes at notes 179-195. 
145. Although professional baseball still has a unique antitrust exemption, a discus-
sion of the issues raised by this exemption is not within the scope of this article. See 
Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see also Federal Baseball Club v. 
National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
146. E.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976); see infra text and notes 
at notes 153-66. 
147. See infra text and notes at notes 167-78. 
148. See infra text and notes at notes 179-312. 
149. E.g. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-18 (1976). The Clayton Act states: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the 
purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or 
to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies 
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). 
150. E.g. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013.(1976) (exempting the business of 
insurance); Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292 (1976) (exempting limited types of 
agricultural cooperatives); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976) (exempting 
certain activities promoting foreign trade). 
151. The district court stated: 
For a set of operative facts to be properly classified as an affirmative defense, 
they must operate as an excuse or justification for the accused, who in effect 
admits his guilt, but pleads non-enforcibility on other grounds. United States 
ex. reI. Crosby v. Delaware, 346 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Del. 1972). 
152. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Aircoach Ttansport Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877, 886 
(1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 930 (1960). 
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1. Statutory Exemptions 
Statutory exemption from the Sherman Act may be granted 
either because applying the Act in a particular case would not 
effectively increase competition, or, because of other policy con-
siderations.153 These concerns have led to the creation of exemp-
tions in areas such as the insurance industry;l54 American busi-
ness competing in foreign commerce;155 pooling activities of small 
businessmen;156 interlocking arrangements in the aviation indus-
try;157 and cooperative associations among fishermen.158 In each 
of these markets, the normal competitive process would be coun-
terproductive as it might actually decrease competition in the 
long run,t59 or frustrate another federal policy.160 Statutory 
exemptions were created to prevent these counterproductive ef-
fects. 
Due to the importance of the policies underlying the antitrust 
laws,16I exemptions which offer blanket immunity are looked on 
with disfavor by legislative bodies and the courtS.I62 The exemp-
tions granted by statute are therefore written so as to exempt the 
minimum number of activities or practices.l63 In addition, the 
courts will construe the exemption as narrowly as possible.l64 
The creation of a statutory exemption requires that Congress 
foresee conflicts between the pertinent statute and the Sherman 
153. C. KA YSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POllCY 189, 190 (1959). 
154. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (1976). 
155. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976). 
156. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 638, 640 (1976) (exempting certain small 
business arrangements). 
157. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378, 1379, 1382, 1384 (1976 & Supp. III 
1979) (exempting certain mergers, acquisitions, and interlocking arrangements). 
158. Fisherman's Collective Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (1976). 
159. In the case of fishermen, for example, large fishing companies could price the 
small fisherman out of the marketplace. To counteract this possibility, small fishermen 
were granted the right to form cooperatives under the Fisherman's Collective Marketing 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522 (1976). 
160. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, for example, was passed to enable states to regu-
late and tax the business of insurance in the state. St. Paul Marine Insurance Co. v. 
Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 539 (1978). 
161. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
162. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). 
163. [d. at 350, 351. 
164. In Group Health & Life Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), the 
Supreme Court reiterated that, "it is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust 
laws are to be narrowly construed. This doctrine is not limited to implicit exemptions 
from the antitrust laws, but applies with equal force to express statutory exemptions." 
[d. at 231 (applying the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976». 
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Act. This clairvoyance is unlikely and situations often arise in 
which an unforeseen conflict exists between statutes. The Courts, 
in recognition of this problem, created an implied immunity from 
the antitrust laws,165 which has the same effect as exemptions 
created by statute.166 
2. Implied Immunity 
If a statutory exemption does not exist, but immunity is neces-
sary to effectuate another statutory scheme, antitrust immunity 
may be judicially implied. The court's perception of the antitrust 
laws as an expression of a fundamental national policy167 to en-
able enterprise to be carried on in an unfettered marketplace168 
places severe limitations on the granting of implied immunities.169 
Courts will grant implied immunity only when a "clear repug-
nancy" between the antitrust laws and the regulatory scheme at 
issue has been shown.170 Since immunity is granted solely upon a 
showing of repugnancy in a specific situation by a specific defen-
dant, the immunity applies only to that case, and then only to the 
extent necessary to enable the conflicting regulations or laws to 
function.171 
The requirement of a "clear repugnancy" between the antitrust 
laws and the objective of another legislative act requires that the 
defendant show that Congress fully intended to provide the im-
plied immunity.172 In National GeriMedical Hospital & Gerontol-
ogy Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City,173 the Supreme Court 
made this point with reference to the health care industry: 
165. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). 
166. See supm text and notes at notes 153-66. 
167. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966). 
168. The Supreme Court has stated that: 
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna 
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic 
freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection 
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and 
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete ... 
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
169. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963). 
170. Id.; Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); Nat'l Gerimedical 
Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). 
171. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
172. Nat'l Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 
U.S. 378, 388 (1981). 
173. 452 U.S. 388 (1981). 
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[T]here are some activities that must, by implication, be im-
mune from antitrust attack. If Health Systems Agencies 
[HSA's] and state agencies are to exercise their authorized 
powers ... where, for example, an HSA has expressly advo-
cated a form of cost saving cooperation among providers [of 
health care], it may be that anti-trust immunity is necessary 
to make the National Health Planning and Resource Devel-
opment Act work.174 
629 
This reasoning calls for the purest sort of implied immunity, one 
based on a basic conflict between the antitrust laws and the goals 
of a subsequent act of Congress. 
An alternative line of reasoning was followed in United States v. 
National Association of Securities Dealers.175 In this case, after 
lengthy discussion of the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
authority to monitor restraint of trade in the securities industry, 
the Supreme Court held that: 
In generally similar situations, we have implied immunity in 
particular and discreet instances to assure that the federal 
agency entrusted with regulation in the public interest could 
carry out that responsibility free from the disruption of 
conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercis-
ing jurisdiction under the antitrust laws (citations omitted). 
In this instance, maintenance of an antitrust action for ac-
tivities so directly related to the SEC's responsibilities poses 
a substantial danger that appellees would be subjected to 
duplicative and inconsistent standards. This is hardly the 
result that Congress would have mandated. We, therefore, 
hold that ... the Sherman Act has been displaced by the 
pervasive regulatory scheme established by the Maloney and 
Investment Company Acts.176 
This form of implied immunity is almost a statutory exemption in 
that the enabling legislation of the regulatory agency authorized 
that agency to supervise the type of conduct under antitrust 
challenge, and thereby removes that activity from the purview of 
the Sherman Act, even though the Court did not necessarily find 
a direct statutory conflict. Under this approach and the approach 
174. [d. at 393 n.18 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5). HSAs 
are local health planning agencies of the Federal Government called Health Systems 
Agencies. They are authorized under P.L. 93-641, the National Health Planning and 
Resource Development Act. Their main purpose is to control the cost of health care by 
limiting growth and expenditures in the health care industry. 
175. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
176. 422 U.S. at 734, 735. 
630 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [VoL 11:609 
taken by the Supreme Court in Blue Cross-where a statutory 
conflict resulted in an implied exclusion from the Sherman Act-
the result is the same: the immunity is implied to facilitate the 
functioning of subsequent legislation which is either in conflict 
with, or appears to supersede, the Sherman Act. 
In addition to immunity implied by statutory conflict or overlap, 
the Supreme Court has also created an exemption for govern-
ment approved transactions. This exemption, termed the "state 
action exemption," excepts from the Sherman Act actions taken 
which are mandated and supervised by a state.177 It was this 
exemption that the city of Akron relied upon in the Hybud litiga-
tion.178 
3. The State Action Exemption 
Actions which normally violate the Sherman Act may be re-
moved from the scope of the Act by virtue of the judicially created 
state action exemption. In essence, this exemption protects ac-
tions taken by the state from scrutiny under the antitrust laws. 
The state action exemption was first enunciated in Parker v. 
Brown,179 a 1943 Supreme Court decision which held that state 
approval of an action may give rise to an exemption from the 
Sherman Act.180 For the next thirty years, the lower courts ana-
lyzed state action cases without further direction from the Su-
preme Court.181 The Supreme Court, after denying certiorari for 
decades, then reentered the state action field, deciding a series of 
cases beginning in 1975.182 These decisions created ever-
177. See infra text and notes at notes 179-312. 
178. See infra text and notes at notes 313-80. 
179. 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see infra text and notes at notes 184-195. 
180. Id. at 352. 
181. Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 
(1972); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 1062 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. 
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 850 (1970); 
Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryand-Buckner Assocs., Inc., 372 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 387 U.S. 904 (1967); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massport Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st 
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (l966); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Larson, 257 
F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 879 (1958); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. 
v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230·(D.C. Cir. 1951); Alphin v. Hensen, 392 F. Supp. 813 (D. Md. 1975), 
afi'd per curiam, 538 F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976). 
182. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (discussed infra text and notes 
at notes 196-205); Cantor DBA Seldin Drugs v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976) 
(discussed infra text and notes at not.es 206-25); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350 (1977) (discussed infra text and notes at notes 226-235); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power 
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narrowing standards for state action and thus led to much uncer-
tainty as to the tests to be applied in each case. It was not until 
two recent cases, decided in 1980 and 1982,183 that the Court 
clearly delineated what the modern requirements would be for 
the state action exemption. 
A. Early Background 
In the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,l84 the Supreme Court for 
the first time addressed the question of immunity from the Sher-
man Act for anticompetitive schemes approved by a state gov-
ernment.1S5 At issue in Parker was a state run program designed 
to stabilize the price of raisins by controlling the flow of raisins 
into the marketplace.1s6 Brown, a producer and packager of 
raisins, challenged the program as a restraint of trade violative of 
section one of the Sherman Act.1s7 The Court upheld the program, 
finding that it derived its authority from a state legislative com-
mand to stabilize raisin prices without which the program would 
not have come into existence. ISS The Court went on to conclude 
that even though the action taken might have violated the Sher-
man Act if it had been done by private individuals, the action in 
this case had been taken by the state. It was not, therefore, within 
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.lS9 
The most significant aspect of the opinion was the Court's 
application of federalism principles to the activities at issue. The 
Court reasoned that since the Sherman Act did not specifically 
include actions by states within its purview, and since the federal 
& Light, 435 u.s. 389 (1978) (discussed infra text and notes at notes 262-82); California 
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. MidCal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (discussed infra 
text and notes at notes 236-60); Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 
Colorado, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (discussed infra text and notes at notes 283-308). 
183. 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Community Communications, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
184. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, a three-judge district court held that the enforce-
ment of the marketing program be enjoined as it affected appellee Brown. Parker, 39 
F. Supp. 895, 902 (1941). 
185. 317 U.S. at 350. 
186. Id. at 348. 
187. Id. at 344. 
188. Specifically, the Court held: "But it is plain that the prorate program here was 
never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its 
authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not in-
tended to operate or become effective without that command." Id. at 350. 
189. The Court held that: "Here the state command to the commission and to the 
program committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the 
Sherman Act since, in view of the latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a 
prohibition of individual and not state action." Id. at 352. 
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government could only subtract from the state's authority in 
certain constitutionally permissible areas, the Court could not 
nullify a state's control over its officers and agents without the 
express direction of Congress.190 Therefore, the Court exempted 
the action taken by the state from the purview of the Sherman 
Act.191 
The state action exemption that grew out of the Parker decision 
was based on the Court's use of federalism principles.l92 Since the 
Court ruled that the Sherman Act applies to private actionl93 and 
not to state action,l94 the issue under a Parker analysis is, what 
type of action is "state action" for purposes of the Act. Only if the 
action taken by the state satisfies the state action test will that 
action, though violative of the Sherman Act if taken privately, be 
exempt from the scope of the Act.l95 
B. The Development of the Current State Action Test 
The development of the modern state action test began in 1975 
with the Supreme Court decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar,196 Goldfarb was a purchaser of real estate who required a 
title search.197 The local bar association had published a recom-
mended fee schedule for use by local attorneys.19S Goldfarb, after 
unsuccessfully searching the marketplace for a title search cost-
ing less than the recommended fee, brought an action against the 
bar for price fixing. l99 The local bar claimed that the state bar had 
"prompted" it to issue the fee schedules.20o The local bar then 
argued that since the state bar is regulated by the State Supreme 
Court, an agency of the state, the local bar's action was exempt 
from the Sherman Act under the state action exemption.201 
190. Id. at 350, 351. 
191. Id. at 351. 
192. Handler, Antitrust 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1374-88 (1978). 
193. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. 
194. Id. at 352. 
195. Id. at 350-52. 
196. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The district court found that the fee schedule promulgated 
violated the Sherman Act, 355 F. Supp. 491, 496 (E.D. Va. 1973). On appeal the Court of 
Appeals reversed, 497 F.2d 1,20 (4th Cir. 1974), holding, inter alia, that the enforcement 
of the fee schedule was exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny due to the state action 
exemption. 421 U.S. at 775. 
197. Id. at 775. 
198. Id. at 776. 
199. Id. at 777, 778. 
200. Id. at 790. 
201. Id. at 790. 
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The Goldfarb Court formulated a test for state action which 
required that the "anticompetitive activities be compelled by the 
direction of the state acting as sovereign."202 In other words, the 
Court wanted to see affirmative action by the state directing the 
defendant to take the specific anticompetitive action at issue. In 
applying its test, the Court found that the local bar had attempted 
to control private competition by hinting to its members that a 
deviation from the fee schedule might bring ethical sanction.203 
Therefore, unless it could show that the fee schedule resulted 
from the state acting in its sovereign capacity, the local bar's 
actions would not be protected by the state action exemption and 
would therefore violate the Sherman Act.204 The local bar could 
not make the required showing of state compulsion since there 
was no state directive to create a fee schedule. Therefore, the fee 
schedule, left unprotected by the state action exemption, was held 
to violate the Act.205 
The Goldfarb narrowing of the Parker state involvement test to 
require a showing of state compulsion was only the beginning of 
the Court's readjustment of the state action standard. In Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison,206 the Supreme Court addressed two Sherman 
Act issues: first, whether approval by a state was a positive 
enough action to meet the compulsion standards;207 and second, 
whether the Sherman Act applied to situations where the state is 
a pervasive regulatory force, but the application of the Sherman 
Act would not impair the functioning of the state's regulatory 
scheme.208 
The issue in Cantor was whether a lightbulb distribution pro-
gram conducted by Detroit Edison, and approved by the Michigan 
Public Utilities Commission, was a Sherman Act violation ex-
empted from sanction by the state action doctrine.209 The respon-
dent Detroit Edison claimed exemption under the Parker test, 
arguing that the Sherman Act should not be applied in areas of 
the economy pervasively regulated by the states.210 Additionally, 
202. [d. at 79l. 
203. [d. at 79l. 
204. [d. at 790, 79l. 
205. [d. at 783. 
206. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). 
207. [d. at 58l. 
208. [d. at 58l. 
209. [d. at 581-82. 
210. [d. at 595. 
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the respondent argued, even if the Sherman Act does apply in 
such cases, the explicit approval of the program given by the 
Michigan Public Utilities Commission would satisfy the state ac-
tion exemption requirement.211 
The Court rejected both the state regulation212 and the state 
action exemption213 arguments. In refusing to accept these argu-
ments, the Court developed a four part state regulation test214 to 
determine whether the Sherman Act should be subordinated to 
state regulatory schemes. The initial hurdle required a showing of 
state compulsion.215 The Court reasoned that if the state had in 
fact ordered the party to act it would not be fair to make the party 
liable for merely obeying the state's directive.216 The second part 
of the test required that there be more than just state activity in 
an area regulated by the Sherman Act; rather, the state's regula-
tory program itself must conflict with the antitrust laws.217 The 
211. Id. at 595. 
212. With reference to the Michigan Public Utilities Commission's approval argument, 
the Court concluded that "neither Michigan's approval of the tariff filed by respondent, 
nor the fact that the lamp exchange program may not be terminated until a new tariff is 
filed, is a sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for 
that program." Id. at 598. 
213. Referring to the regulatory scheme argument, the Court held that: 
There are at least three reasons why this argument is unacceptable. First, 
merely because certain conduct may ~ject both to state regulation and to 
the federal antitrust laws does not necessarily mean that it must satisfy incon-
sistent standards; second, even assuming inconsistency, we could not accept the 
view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's; 
and finally, even if we were to assume that Congress did not intend the antitrust 
laws to apply to areas of the economy primarily regulated by a State, that 
assumption would not foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust laws in an 
essentially unregulated area such as the market for electric light bulbs. 
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595. 
214. See generally Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem under Cantor v. Detroit 
Edison, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 527-38 (1977). See also Kennedy, Of Lawyers, 
Lightbulbs, and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine under the Antitrust 
Laws, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 31, 61 (1979). 
215. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 592-94. 
216. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 594-95. The fairness test actually consists of two factors: first, 
whether a party should be held liable for treble damages for his actions; and, second, 
whether it is fair to hold a party liable when he was compelled to act by the state. A 
succinct discussion of the fairness issue is presented in Kennedy, supra note 214, at 61. 
217. In the words of the Court: 
First, merely because certain conduct may be subject both to state regulation 
and to the federal antitrust laws does not necessarily mean that it must satisfy 
inconsistent standards; second, even assuming inconsistency, we could not ac-
cept the view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the 
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third element required reconciling the state's regulatory scheme 
and the antitrust laws with an eye toward limiting the application 
of the Sherman Act to the minimum extent necessary to enable 
the state regulatory scheme to function.218 The fourth aspect 
required balancing the state's regulatory interest against the 
federal government's interest in competition.219 The balancing 
requirement indicated a recognition by the Court that the federal 
interest in competition and the state interest in regulation are 
both legitimate, but that the Court must balance these interests, 
taking into consideration the various policies underlying the 
conflicting programs.220 
The Cantor Court then went on to apply its newly formulated 
test to the facts of the case. The Court first found that the thresh-
old requirement of compulsion was not met. Mere tacit approval, 
the Court held, without Public Utilities Commission or legislative 
investigation and direction would not meet the compulsion re-
quirement.221 Applying the second part of the test, the Court then 
held that state regulation and federal antitrust law are not incon-
sistent solely on the basis of their concurrent existence.222 In fact, 
the Court found that in this case the Sherman Act could be 
applied to the lightbulbs market, which itself was unregulated by 
the state,223 without impairing the state's legitimate regulation of 
electrical energy distribution.224 Lastly, the Court balanced the 
state and federal interests involved and found the state's regula-
tory interest to be non-existent since the market in lightbulbs was 
unregulated.225 
State's and finally, even if we were to assume that Congress did not intend the 
antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy primarily regulated by a State, 
that assumption would not foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust·laws in an 
essentially unregulated area such as the market for electric light bulbs. 
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595. See also Kennedy, supra note 214, at 61. 
218. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 598. See also Kennedy, supra note 214, at 63. 
219. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595-97. 
220. The Court stated that "even assuming inconsistency, we could not accept the 
view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to the State's (interest)." 
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595. See also Kennedy, supra note 214, at 63. 
221. The Court held that "the state's policy was neutral on the question whether a 
utility should, or should not, have such a program." Cantor, 428 U.S. at 585. 
222. It was reasoned by the Court that, "merely because certain conduct may be 
subject both to state regulation and to the federal antitrust laws does not necessarily 
mean that it must satisfy inconsistent standards." Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595. 
223. Id. at 596. 
224. Id. at 598. 
225. The Court reasoned that "even if we were to assume that Congress did not intend 
the antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy primarily regulated by a state, that 
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The Supreme Court again addressed the state action issue in 
1977 in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 226 The significance of Bates 
was twofold. First, it furthered the general understanding of state 
compulsion versus state neutrality. Second, the Court's decision 
led the way to the current standard used by the courts in applying 
the state action exemption. 
At issue in Bates was an Arizona bar ethical canon prohibiting 
attorneys from advertising. Bates, an advertising attorney, as-
serted that the no advertising rule was based on adoption of the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility by the Arizona Su-
preme Court. This adoption, it was argued, was a mere tacit 
approval by the State, and thus did not meet the Cantor compul-
sion requirement.227 Therefore, no state action immunity should 
flow to the bar merely because of its success in having the Code 
adopted. The petitioners also asserted that if the Court applied a 
balancing test, as is called for by Cantor, the policies of the Sher-
man Act would prevail over the state's interest in regulating the 
bar.226 
The Supreme Court distinguished the Cantor case from the 
case before it, finding that the state action exemption protected 
the Arizona bar from Sherman Act liability. The Court reasoned 
that in Cantor there was no independent regulatory interest in 
the lightbulbs market;229 nor was the regulation "a response to 
health or safety concerns."230 In Bates, on the other hand, the 
state, in regulating the bar, was exercising its power to meet its 
responsibility to protect the public.231 The Court also reasoned 
that in Cantor, the state action was merely approval of the light-
assumption would not foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust laws in an essentially 
unregulated area such as the market for electric lightbulbs." Id. at 595. 
226. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the Bar Associa-
tion's claim that Bates had violated the "no advertising" rule. Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 113 Ariz. 394, 396, 555 P.2d 640, 642 (1976). In addition, the Arizona Court also 
found that the "no advertising" rule did not violate the Sherman Act. 113 Ariz. at 396-97, 
555 P.2d at 642-43. 
227. Appellants argued by analogy to Cantor that no immunity should result from the 
bar's success in having the Code adopted by the state. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360; see supra 
text and notes at notes 206-25. 
228. The Court found that "they also assert that the interest embodied in the Sher-
man Act must prevail over the state interest in regulating the bar." 433 U.S. at 360,361. 
229. Id. at 361 (citing with approval Cantor, 428 U.S. at 584, 585). 
230. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361. 
231. "In contrast, the regulation of the activities of the bar is at the core of the State's 
power to protect the public." Id. at 361. 
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bulb distribution program,232 whereas in Bates the state's policy 
was clearly articulated through the adoption of the Code of Pro-
fessional Ethics.233 
The Court then went on to consider the third part of the Cantor 
test which balances the state interest against the federal interest. 
The Court found that there was no real chance that the federal 
antitrust policies were being subordinated to the state's policies 
because the facts indicated that constant state supervision and 
reexamination of the regulations would effectively prevent such 
an imbalance.234 In Cantor, on the other hand, there was no such 
ongoing supervision or reexamination. 
The Bates Court, in summarizing its opinion, gave fair notice as 
to what would be the new state action standard. The Court 
deemed it "significant that the state policy is so clearly and 
affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so 
active."235 The Court was to reiterate this standard in its next 
major state action case, California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. 
MidCal Aluminum, Inc.,236 decided in 1980. 
MidCal is the most recent state action case. The case is also the 
clearest statement of the requirements necessary for a defendant 
to escape the Sherman Act under the state action exemption. The 
issue in MidCal was whether the setting of prices by means of a 
statutorily required fair trade contract between producers, 
wholesalers, and distillers was an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.237 Under California law, no state licensed wine merchant 
232. "Finally, the light-bulb program in Gantor was instigated by the utility with only 
the acquiescence of the state regulatory commission." Id. at 362. 
233. Id. at 362. 
234. The Court reasoned that, "moreover, as the instant case shows, the rules are 
subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Id. at 362. 
235. Id. 
236. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). In MidGul, the California Court of Appeals rejected the claims 
of state action by the Liquor Dealers and found a restraint of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. MidCal Aluminum, Inc., 90 Cal. 
App. 3d 979, 984 (1977), 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (1979). In fact, the next state action case 
was Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 435 U.S. 389 (1978). That case, however, is 
more appropriately viewed as an application of the state action exemption to a munici-
pality. See infra text and notes at notes 268-82. One of the reasons for the strength of the 
MidGul standard is the unanimity ofthe opinion, a fact not present in the previous state 
action cases. The decision was 8-0, with Justice Brennan taking no part in consideration 
of the case. MidGul, 445 U.S. at 98. 
237. The statute requires: 
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifer, and rectifer 
shall: 
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could sell wine to a retailer at a price other than that set by the 
fair trade contract price schedule.238 The Supreme Court held that 
the program "plainly constitutes resale price maintenance in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act."239 Having determined this, the Court 
then went on to consider "whether the State's involvement in the 
price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust immunity 
under Parker v. Brown."240 
In MidCal, the Court designed a two-step test for a defendant to 
show state action sufficient to trigger the state action exemption. 
Echoing the Bates decision, the Court held that the defendant 
first had to show that the challenged restraint was "clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed" as state policy.241 Second, 
the defendant had to prove that the activity was actively super-
vised by the state itself.242 The MidCal defendants satisfied the 
first level of the test by showing that the State Legislature had 
expressly articulated its policy to allow resale price maintenance 
set by the fair trade contract.243 The Court, however, held that the 
defendants failed to meet the second half of the test requiring 
active state supervision.244 The Court found that the state 
"neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the 
price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade con-
tracts. The state does not monitor market conditions or engage in 
any 'pointed reexamination' of the program."245 The Court viewed 
the prices set by the fair trade contract as private price fixing that 
was followed by state enforcement of the prices established by the 
private parties.246 The Court concluded that "the national policy 
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers for which 
his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by the person who 
owns or controls the brand. 
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale prices, if he 
owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or consumers. 
CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 24,866 (West 1964) (repealed 1980). 
238. [d. at § 24,862. 
239. MidCal, 445 U.S. at 103. 
240. [d. at 103. For a discussion of Parker, see supra text and notes at notes 184-195. 
241. [d. at 105. 
242. MidCal, 445 U.S. at 105. 
243. It was held that, "the California system for wine pricing satisfies the first stan-
dard. The legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale 
price maintenance." [d. at 105. 
244. It was further held that "the program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity." [d. at 105. 
245. [d. at 105, 106. 
246. As far back as 1943 and the Pa,rker case, it was held that, "a state does not give 
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by 
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in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a 
gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a pri-
vate price-fixing arrangement."247 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that in the past, state 
approval alone may have created an umbrella of state action 
immunity for private activities. If it is assumed, as it must be, that 
the MidCal decision is the new blueprint for the state action 
exemption defense, qualifying under the exemption may become 
significantly more difficult in the future. MidCal requires that the 
state, acting in its sovereign capacity, clearly articulate and 
affirmatively express the anticompetitive policy at issue.248 As 
indicated by the Supreme Court, the affirmative expression re-
quirement will not be satisfied by evidence of state "prompting" 
as in Bates. 249 Nor will the standard be met by the mere tacit state 
approval offered in Cantor.250 Rather, the test requires a showing 
of narrow statutory or regulatory language; language requiring 
the anticompetitive action, which is promulgated by the state 
legislature.251 
In addition, the MidCal test requires that the anticompetitive 
policy be actively supervised by the state.252 The supervision re-
quirement is often the most difficult hurdle for the defendant to 
clear. The supervision must be carried out by a state agency253 or 
another branch of the state government254 specifically authorized 
to monitor the activity. The monitoring should take the form of 
ongoing reviews255 examining market conditions,256 judging the 
reasonableness of the anticompetitive action,257 and ascertaining 
whether the anticompetitive program is actually meeting its 
declaring that their action is lawful." Parker, 317 U.S. at 351, cited in MidGal, 455 U.S. at 
106. 
247. MidGal, 445 U.S. at 106. 
248. See supra text and notes at notes 241-42. 
249. See supra text and notes at notes 226-35. 
250. See supra text and notes at notes 206-25. 
251. MidGal, 445 U.S. at 105. 
252. See supra text and notes at notes 241-42. 
253. In Parker, the Court stated that: "It is the state which has created the machinery 
for establishing the prorate program ... it is the state, acting through its commission, 
which adopts the program and which enforces it." Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. 
254. See Bates, in which the Court held: "The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party 
in interest; it adopted the rules." Bates, 433 U.S. at 361. 
255. See MidGal, 445 U.S. at 105 (exemption failed due to lack of ongoing reviews). 
256. See id. at 106 (exemption failed due to lack of monitoring of market conditions). 
257. See id. at 105 (exemption failed due to no examination of the reasonableness of 
the prices). 
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stated goals.258 Because of the stringent supervision require-
ments, it is possible for a claim to pass the clear articulation 
standard, yet still fail to obtain the state action exemption be-
cause the program did not meet the supervision requirement. 
Even though it is now apparent that state involvement may 
supply immunity for state actions, the question remains whether 
the state action immunity defense is available to municipalities. 
Only twice have municipalities taken this issue to the Supreme 
Court.259 Both of these cases, though holding against the applica-
tion of the exemption to the specific facts, indicated the standards 
by which a city's claim to the state action exemption would be 
judged.260 In order to understand when the state action exemp-
tion will be available to a defendant-municipality accused of anti-
competitive activity, it is necessary to examine both cases in 
detail. 
C. Use of the State Action Exemption by Municipalities 
Since the passage of the Sherman Act, cities, being corporate 
entities, have been liable to suit undet the Act's provisions.261 
When the Supreme Court began to reformulate the state action 
exemption in the mid-seventies, it appeared to municipal corpora-
tions that the exemption might offer needed immunity for their 
anticompetitive actions. In 1978 the applicability of the state ac-
tion exemption to municipalities was first addressed by the Su-
preme Court in LaFayette v. Louisiana Power & Light CO.262 
Lafayette v. Louisiana P()wer & Light Co. was the result of a 
battle between a utility owned by a municipality and a private 
power company.263 The City of Lafayette operated its electrical 
utility under a grant of power from the State of Louisiana.264 The 
258. See id. at 106 (exemption failed due to lack of pointed reexamination of the 
program). 
259. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See infra text and 
notes at notes 262-82; Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See 
infra text and notes at notes 283-308. 
260. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413; Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52. 
261. 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) defines "person[s)" to include "corporations and associations 
existing under or authorized by the laws ... of any State." 
262. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The district court granted the city's motion to dismiss, finding 
that the antitrust laws were inapplicable due to the state action exemption. The circuit 
court however, reversed this holding and remanded. 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976). 
263. 435 U.S. at 391-92. 
264. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4162 (West 1966) states that: "Any municipal corpora-
tion ... may construct, acquire, extend, or improve any revenue producing public utility 
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city agreed to provide customers with water and gas only if the 
customers purchased electricity from the city-owned utility.265 
The Louisiana Power and Light Company, a privately owned 
company, provided power to the areas surrounding Lafayette.266 
The city alleged that the private power company had violated 
sections one and two of the Sherman Act by instigating boycotts 
and frivolous litigation, and by otherwise attempting to 
monopolize generation of electrical power by foreclosing supply 
lines.267 The private power company counterclaimed that, in fact, 
the city had violated sections one and two of the Sherman Act and 
section three of the Clayton Act,268 by using the same monopolis-
tic practices.269 The city moved for dismissal of the counterclaim 
on the ground that "as cities and subdivisions of the State of 
Louisiana, the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown rendered 
federal antitrust laws inapplicable to them."27o 
In a sharply divided opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the 
application of the Parker doctrine to cities.271 The city argued that 
its status as a city made them an agent of the state. Because of 
this agency relationship, it was argued, a congressional intent not 
to subject the city to the antitrust laws must be inferred,272 
thereby widening the state action exemption to include cities. In a 
plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, however, the Court rejected 
... either within or without its boundaries and may operate and maintain the utility in 
the interest of the public." 
265. This plan is essentially a tying arrangement, in which a seller will sell a desired 
item only if the buyer will purchase an additional item. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. 
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
266. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 391-92. 
267. Id. at 392 n.5. 
268. The Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) is a general prohibition of agreements 
between a lessor and lessee or seller and purchaser that the lessee will not deal with a 
competitor of the lessor. 
269. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392 n.6. 
270. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 392. 
271. Justice Brennan wrote part I of the opinion in which Justices Burger, Marshall, 
Powell and Stevens joined. In parts II and Ill, Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens 
joined with Justice Brennan. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice 
Burger filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice 
Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined and 
with which Justice Blackmun joined with the exception of part IIB. Justice Blackmun 
also filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 390. 
272. The Court analyzed the arguments in this manner: "Petitioners' principal argu-
ment is that 'since a city is merely a subdivision of a state and only exercises power 
delegated to it by the state, Parker's findings regarding the Congressionally intended 
scope of the Sherman Act apply with equal force to such political subdivisions.' " Id. at 
394. See also id. at 397, where the Court refers to this argument as the "argument for 
exemption as agents of the State." 
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this argument and analyzed the problem under a balancing test. 
The Court found that the city must overcome the presumption 
against exclusion from the antitrust laws.273 The Court held that 
a city could gain an exclusion based on its status only if it could 
"demonstrate that there are countervailing policies which are 
sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption."274 The Court 
concluded that the city had not shown such powerful countervail-
ing policies. Thus, the Court reasoned, subjecting the city to liabil-
ity would not submerge policies that should displace the antitrust 
laws.275 The Court concluded that the· state action exemption 
should not be expanded to include cities based solely on their 
status as such,276 and that the exemption was not available to 
Lafayette based on the facts before the Court. 
Lafayette had also claimed that even if a congressional intent 
to exempt cities from the purview of the Sherman Act could not 
be inferred, the Parker doctrine itself could be seen as an exemp-
tion for cities as well as for states.277 The plurality analyzed this 
claim by reviewing the applicable line of cases.278 Justice Brennan 
reasoned that Parker applied to exempt the state when it acted in 
its sovereign capacity.279 Brennan then found that since cities 
themselves are not sovereign,280 extending the Parker doctrine to 
include cities would be inconsistent with the sovereignty limita-
tion.281 
273. ld. at 399. 
274. ld. at 400. 
275. ld. at 408 (referring to countervailing policies to be balanced against the antitrust 
laws). For a policy that did overcome the presumption, see Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), where the Court held that 
organizations created to lobby for legislative action will overcome the presumption 
against repeal since open communication to law makers is vital to the functioning of a 
representative democracy. 
276. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 397. See also Justice Brennan's concurrence which stated 
that "municipalities, simply by their status as such, are not within the Parker doctrine." 
ld. at 413 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
277. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 394. 
278. See supra note 179; Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408-17. 
279. It was held that: "The state ... as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of 
government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." Lafayette, 435 U.S. 
at 409 (citing with approval Parker, 317 U.S. at 352). 
280. The Court found that: "Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive 
all the federal deference of the States that create them." Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412. 
281. Justice Brennan concluded that: "Parker's limitation of the exemption to 'official 
action directed by a state,' 317 U.S. at 351, is consistent with the fact that the States' 
subdivisions generally have not been treated as equivalents of the states themselves." 
ld. at 412 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
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The plurality did not deny municipalities all access to immu-
nity. Rather, the plurality limited the application of the Parker 
immunity by holding that "the Parker doctrine exempts only 
anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by 
the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state 
policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public 
service."282 Thus, a municipality could successfully employ the 
state action exemption only if it could demonstrate that its ac-
tions and resulting anticompetitive effects complied with state 
policy. Lafayette, therefore, raised a question as to how a city 
could prove that its anticompetitive actions were taken pursuant 
to state policy. The opportunity to address this question arose 
several years later in the 1982 case of Community Communica-
tions Company, Inc. v. Boulder.283 
The litigation arose out of actions taken by the City of Boulder, 
Colorado, to prohibit the Community Communications Company 
from expanding its cable television service area for three 
months.284 The city imposed the moratorium to give the city coun-
cil time to draft a new model cable television code and enable 
other competing cable operators to enter the marketplace.285 
Community Communications brought suit, claiming that the 
moratorium was a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman 
282. Id. at 413 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
283. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). In response to Community Communications' claim that the 
expansion moratorium violated the Sherman Act, the district court found that the 
ordinance did violate the Act and that the state action exemption was inapplicable. 
Community Communications, Inc. v. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 1980). 
Accordingly, the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the city. On 
appeal, the circuit court reversed, holding that the state action exemption did apply to 
shield the city. Community Communications, Inc. v. Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
284. City of Boulder, Colorado Ordinance No. 4473 (1979), cited in Community Com-
munications, 455 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
285. In the preamble to the ordinance, the city justified its actions by finding: 
(1) Other cable TV operators have indicated an interest in serving the Boulder 
community; 
(2) Community Communications plans to expand in the near future; 
(3) Such expansion would hinder the opportunity for other cable TV operators 
to move into the area; 
(4) The city intends to adopt a model code and invite other operators to compete 
with Community Communications; 
(5) That temporary geographical and time constraints on its activities would 
not harm Community Communications' ability to improve the services it 
offers to the city. 
City of Boulder, Colorado Ordinance No. 4423 (1979), cited in Community Communica-
tions, 455 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
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Act.286 Boulder responded that the moratorium was a legitimate 
exercise of the city's legislative powers287 and that the city en-
joyed antitrust immunity under the Parker state action doc-
trine.288 In considering these arguments, the Supreme Court 
found that the issue was "whether a 'home rule'289 municipality, 
granted by the state constitution extensive powers of self-
government in local and municipal matters, enjoys the 'state 
action' exemption from Sherman Act liability announced in 
Parker v. Brown."290 
The Community Communications Court relied on Lafayette for 
the proposition that a municipality could gain immunity under 
Parker if certain requirements were met. The standard defined in 
Lafayette, however-that the anticompetitive action must be en-
gaged in pursuant to a state policy291-was interpreted extremely 
narrowly by the Court. In Community Communications, the 
Court held that for a city to successfully invoke the state action 
exemption, the city must show specific state authorization for the 
anticompetitive actions.292 The authorization required may be 
shown either by action taken by the state itself or by the MidCal 
286. 455 U.S. at 46-47. 
287. The Colorado home rule provision provided that: 
[Each city of over 2000 inhabitants may] make, amend, add to or replace the 
charter ... which shall be its organic law in local and municipal matters; such 
charter shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said 
city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith; 
this article grants the people of the eligible municipalities the full rite of 
self-government in both local and municipal matters; 
The statutes of the state of Colorado shall apply ... except insofar as superseded 
by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such 
charters. 
Cow. CONST. art. XX, § 6. 
288. 455 U.S. at 47. See supra text and notes at notes 179-282. 
289. See supra text and notes at notes 104-16. 
290. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 43. 
291. The Court held that: "Under the plurality's standard, the Parker doctrine would 
shield from antitrust liability municipal conduct engaged in 'pursuant to state policy to 
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.' " Id. at 51 (quoting 
Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413). The quote, however, is qualified by the Court's statement 
that: "It was stressed, however, that the 'state policy' relied upon would have to be 
'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed.' " Community Communications, 455 
U.S. at 51 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410). 
292. The Court took note of the Lafayette reasoning: "Municipalities 'are not them-
selves sovereign' and ... accordingly they could partake of the Parker exemption only to 
the extent that they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
state policy" Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 54 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 
413). 
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"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy 
standard.293 In addition, the city must meet the MidCal require-
ment of ongoing supervision.294 Thus, in narrowing the require-
ments for municipalities attempting to obtain the state action 
exemption as defined in Lafayette, the Court made the MidCal 
state action test the new general standard for municipalities.295 
Applying its new test, the Court held that Boulder could not be 
exempted from the Sherman Act unless the city made the re-
quired showing of clear articulation and affirmative expression by 
the state legislature, coupled with the necessary state supervision 
of the program.296 Anticipating this holding, Boulder had con-
tended that the state home rule provision was demonstrative of 
state authorization of the anticompetitive actions taken by the 
city.297 The Court, however, found this argument without merit, 
reasoning that a home rule amendment was "a mere tacit ap-
proval of the actions taken by a municipality."298 It was the 
Court's opinion that "a state that allows its municipalities to do as 
they please can hardly be said to have contemplated the specific 
anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought in 
this case."299 
293. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52. 
294. Although the Court does not reach the supervision issue, it is indicated that 
supervision is the second half of the test: "We do not reach the question whether [the] 
ordinance must or could satisfy the 'active state supervision test' focused on in MidCal." 
Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 52 n.14. 
295. The Court found that: 
In MidCal we held that a California resale price maintenance system, affecting 
all wine producers and wholesalers within the State, was not entitled to exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. In so holding, we explicitly adopted the principle, 
expressed in the plurality opinion in City of Lafayette, that anticompetitive 
restraints engaged in by state municipalities or subdivisions must be "clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" in order to gain an 
antitrust exemption. MidCal, 445 U.S. at 105. The price maintenance system at 
issue in MidCal was denied such an exemption because it failed to satisfy the 
'active state supervision' criterion described in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410, 
as underlying our decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
Because we conclude in the present case that Boulder's moratorium ordinance 
does not satisfy the 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' criterion we do 
not reach the question whether that ordinance must or could satisfy the 'active 
state supervision' test focused upon in MidCal. 
Id. at 51-52 & n.14. (The Court's cites to Lafayette refer to Justice Brennan's concurring 
opinion in which Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined.) 
296. Id. at 52. 
297. Id. at 54-55. 
298. Id. at 55. 
299. Id. 
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Boulder had also argued that the delegation of power by means 
of a home rule provision gave the city the sovereignty of the state 
for the purposes of locallegislation.3°O Thus, argued the city, the 
grant of sovereignty so given should trigger the application of the 
state action exemption to the anticompetitive actions of the 
city.301 The Court vehemently disagreed with this argument, as 
well, holding that the nation is a dual system of federal and state 
governmental entities,302 and that "there exists within the broad 
domain of sovereignty but these twO."303 In the words of the Court 
"we are a nation not of 'city-states' but of States."304 
Continuing to address home rule provisions in general, the 
Court held that a home rule prqvision merely grants powers and 
thus does not give rise to an implication of affirmative direction 
by the state.305 In fact, the Court found that the relationship 
between the actions of the City of Boulder and the State of 
Colorado was one of "precise neutrality."306 Such a neutral pos-
ture does not give rise to the clearly articulated, affirmatively 
expressed directive required to trigger the state action exemp-
tion.307 If such a proposition were accepted, the Court reasoned, 
the acceptance "would wholly eviscerate the concepts of 'clear 
articulation and affirmative expression' that our precedents re-
quire."308 Thus, the Court clearly put to rest the argument that 
the municipality is a sovereign entity by virtue of its home-rule 
authority, and thus entitled to protection from Sherman Act lia-
bility by the state action exemption. 
In summary, it is evident that cities may use the state action 
exemption to protect their anticompetitive activities.309 The stan-
dard that must be satisfied by a municipality claiming the exemp-
300. [d. at 52 ("Colorado's Home Rule Amendment ... vested in the City of Boulder 
every power theretofore possessed by the legislature .. ' .. "). 
301. [d. at 53 (city acting as the state in local matters, which meets the state action 
criterion of Parker). 
302. [d. ("Ours is a dual system of government which has no place for sovereign 
cities," (citing Parker, 317 U.S. at 351». 
303. [d. (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886». 
304. Community Communication8, 455 U.S. at 54 (quoting the court of appeals Com-
munity Communications decision, 630 F.2d 704, 717 (10th Cir. 1980». 
305. The Court held: "A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can 
hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticompetitive actions for which 
municipal liability is sought." Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 55. 
306. [d. 
307. [d. 
308. [d. at 56. 
309. See supra text and notes at notes 261-308. 
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tion, however, is quite stringent. A city must show a clear and 
affirmative state directed program, over which the city has no 
discretionary power.310 The city will also have to show that the 
state legislature or authorized state agency is monitoring the 
anticompetitive program on an ongoing basis.3ll Neither a city's 
status as such,312 nor the existence of a home rule provision will 
satisfy the exemption requirements. If a municipality can meet 
these requirements, however, then state action immunity may be 
granted. Against this statutory and common law background, the 
Hybud litigation developed. 
V. THE LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE AKRON SOLUTION 
A. Litigation to Date 
As discussed above,313 Akron developed a solid waste disposal 
program in the 1970s which centered around an incineration! 
energy production facility. In order to guarantee an adequate 
supply of waste for the new facility, the city required that all 
waste be disposed of at the new plant. This regulation was chal-
lenged as a violation of the federal antitrust laws by a group of 
Akron landfill operators whose businesses were affected by the 
program.314 In 1978 two landfill operators, Glenwillow Landfill 
and Hybud Equipment Corp., claimed that actions taken by the 
city to guarantee the flow of solid waste fuel to the municipal 
facility violated their right to a free and unfettered competitive 
market.315 In District Court, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,316 
that the ordinance violated sections one and two of the Sherman 
Act.317 The plaintiffs asked for a declaratory judgment and in-
junctive relief.3lB 
310. See supra text and note at note 292. 
311. See supra text and note at note 294. 
312. See supra at note 276. 
313. See supra text and notes at notes 24-59. 
314. Hybud, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'd Hybud, 485 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Ohio 1979), 
vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). 
315. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 673 (E.D. Ohio 1979). 
316. Other claims made by the plaintiffs in the district court included: deprivation of 
due process under the 14th Amendment; unlawful taking of property under the 5th 
Amendment; and unlawful restraint of interstate commerce in violation of art. I, § 8 of 
the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the acts taken 
were cmtside the powers ofthe municipal corporation under the powers granted by Omo 
CoNSTITUTION art. XVIII, § 3. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 673. 
317. For a discussion of these sections, see supra text and notes at notes 114-40. 
318. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 673-74. 
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The City of Akron answered that its actions were protected 
under the state action exemption to the Sherman Act.319 The city 
based its state action argument on two claims: first, that the 
OWDA as a state agency could authorize regulation and im-
plementation of solid waste recycling programs; and second, that 
the home rule powers granted to the city by the state give the 
city the same protective cloak against antitrust actions as that 
possessed by the state.320 
The district court agreed with the city's arguments. In Hybud 
Equipment Corp. v. Akron,321 the court held that the city was 
protected by the state action exemption.322 In holding for the city, 
the district court applied the Bates state action test.323 The court 
interpreted Bates as requiring first, a demonstration of the state's 
interest in protecting the public welfare, and second, a clearly 
articulated state policy to restrain trade in order to achieve spec-
ified policy goals.324 Applying these standards to the situation in 
Akron, the district court found that the OWDA was a state 
agency;325 that the state had a "legitimate interest in protecting 
the public by promoting safe and sanitary methods of solid waste 
disposal";326 and that these state policies were clearly articulated 
in the enabling statutes for the OWDA.327 Thus, since the Bates 
standards were satisfied, the district court held that the state 
action exemption applied to shield the city from liability.328 
The court went on to find that, in addition to being eligible for 
state action immunity under Bates, the city was also exempt 
under the Supreme Court's opinion in Lafayette.329 The district 
court viewed Lafayette as granting Sherman Act immunity 
"when it is found 'from the authority given a governmental entity 
to operate in a particular area that the legislature contemplated 
319. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 677. For a discussion of the state action exemption, see 
supra text and notes at notes 260-312. 
320. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 675. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. at 677-78. 
323. Id. at 676. For a discussion of Bates, see supra text and notes at notes 226-35. 
324. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 676. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. For a discussion of § 6123.03 and the OWDA, see supra text and notes at notes 
97-103. 
328. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 677. 
329. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 677-78. 
1984] SHERMAN ACT 649 
the kind of action complained of.' "330 In applying this test to the 
situation in Akron, the district court found that in establishing 
the OWDA, Ohio had contemplated the possibility that munici-
palities might choose to provide for solid waste disposal by 
monopolizing the market.331 Thus, under the reasoning of the 
Lafayette decision, the court held, the municipality was found to 
be exempt from the scope of the Sherman Act.332 
On appea}333 in 1981, the Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the hold-
ing of the district court exempting Akron from the application of 
the Sherman Act.334 The circuit court reasoned that in Ohio the 
home rule provision335 as well as the courts,3:36 authorized local 
governments to create a municipal solid waste monopoly.337 The 
court went on to find that an agency of the state, such as the 
OWDA, provided the necessary supervision required under Mid-
Cal. 338 Lastly, the circuit court found that the solid waste 
monopoly was in the public interest as that interest is defined by 
the Congress and the Ohio legislature.339 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the anticompetitive action was exempt from the Sher-
man Act.340 
The private landfill operation appealed the decision of the 
circuit court to the Supreme Court.341 It was petitioners good 
330. Id. at 677 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415). In addition, the district court found 
that: "Today's decision does not threaten the legitimate exercise of governmental power, 
nor does it preclude municipal government from providing services on a monopoly 
basis." Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 677 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 416-17). 
331. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 677 (citing State ex reI. Moock v. Cincinnati, 120 Ohio St. 
500,166 N.E. 583 (1929»; Canton v. Van Voorhis, 61 Ohio App. 419, 22 N.E.2d 651 (1939). 
332. Hybud, 485 F. Supp. at 678. 
333. Hybud, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981). 
334. The circuit court held that: "We find no federal constitutional or statutory viola-
tion and accordingly affirm." Id. at 1188. 
335. For a discussion of home rule provisions, see supra text and notes at notes 104-16. 
336. Id. 
337. Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1195. 
338. The circuit court found that: "The legal system of the state specifically allows the 
municipal ordinance'in question here, and an agency of the state, the Water Authority, 
maintains some oversight of the facility." Id. at 1195-96. 
339. The appeals court held that: "Finally, the United States Government has advised 
us that this municipal activity is in accord with federal energy and environmental policy 
as established in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act .... " Hybud, 654 F.2d at 
1196. For a discussion of the Act, see supra text and notes at notes 63-96. 
340. The court held that: "Since solid waste disposal including the regulation of 
garbage collection, incineration and 'recycling' is a customary area of local concern long 
reserved to state and local governments by practice, tradition and legal precedent, the 
Sherman Act should not apply." Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1196. 
341. 455 U.S. 931 (1982). 
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fortune that the Court had just delineated new state action 
exemption requirements in Community Communications.342 The 
Court summarily vacated and remanded Hybud to the circuit 
court343 for decision in accordance with the Community Com-
munications decision. 
The circuit court proceeded to remand the case to the district 
court for a decision consistent with Community Communica-
tions. 344 In applying the Community Communications standards 
for granting the state action exemption to a municipality, which 
incorporates, in part, the MidCal test,345 District Court Judge 
Manos found for the City of Akron.346 The court applied the first 
part of the MidCal test-which requires that state support for the 
monopolistic practice be evidenced by clear articulation and 
affirmative expression of legislative intent347-and held that the 
city had established the necessary legislative direction. In finding 
clear articulation and affirmative expression, the court relied 
upon the enabling statutes of the OWDA.348 The court found that 
the OWDA statutes 
indicate that the state legislature granted the OWDA broad 
authority to covenant with municipalities 'with a view to 
effective cooperation and safeguarding of the respective 
interests of the parties' (citation omitted). That the legisla-
ture contemplated the use of anti-competitive measures to 
ensure the financial viability of its waste disposal facilities is 
unquestionable.349 
The court found legislative support for Akron's use of monopolis-
tic regulations in the OWDA authorizing statute which prohibits 
it from financing "any competing projects that would undermine 
the financial feasibility of an existing development project."350 
The court reasoned that by directing the OWDA to refrain from 
supporting any project which provided competition to an existing 
OWDA project, the Legislature was articulating its support for 
the concept that such state-financed projects should operate free 
from market competition. 
342. 455 U.S. 40 (1982); see supra text and notes at notes 283-312. 
343. Hybud, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). 
344. 701 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982). 
345. 445 U.S. at 105. For a discussion of MidCal, see supra text and notes at notes 
236-60. 
346. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. ~ 65,356, at p. 70,114(1982). 
347. 445 U.S. at 105. 
348. 1983-1 Trade Cas. at p. 70,122. 
349. Id. at p. 70,122. 
350. Id. 
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B. The Akron Litigation: Prognosis 
The court's finding of exemption, necessary to uphold the 
monopolistic regulations vital to the project, may have been wise 
for policy reasons. Unfortunately, however, this finding is incon-
sistent with the state action test, as articulated by the Supreme 
Court in MidCal and Community Communications. Under the 
sections relating to the powers and duties of the OWDA, the 
legislature has simply granted the Authority power to offer 
financial assistance for a city project.351 In fact, the sections do 
nothing more than authorize the OWDA to "make loans and 
grants ... and adopt rules and procedures for making such loans 
and grants."352 The statute does give the OWDA the power to do 
what acts are necessary to carry out the duties delineated in the 
statute.353 These powers, however, relate solely to financial and 
technical assistance, and in no way specifically authorize the 
creation of anticompetitive programs by a city. This type of enabl-
ing statute is not representative of the clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed legislative intent required by the Su-
preme Court in Community Communications. Rather, the deci-
sions require a demonstration that the state clearly anticipated 
and authorized the specific anticompetitive actions at issue. In 
fact, the cases relied on by Judge Manos in finding for the city 
provide examples of the specific legislative authorization required 
by the Supreme Court; authorization that is not present in Akron. 
They are thus distinguishable from the situation in Akron. 
In finding that the OWDA financial enabling statutes consti-
tute articulation of support by the state sufficient to meet the 
Community Communication requirement, the court relied on four 
post-Community Communications decisions.354 In Hallie v. Eau 
Claire,355 the Town of Hallie sued the City of Eau Claire, Wiscon-
351. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 6124.04 (Baldwin 1982), cited in Hybud 1983-1 Trade Cas. 
at p. 70,121. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. 
354. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 1983-1 Trade Cas. ~ 65,227, No. 82-1715, Slip Op. (7th Cir. Feb. 
17,1983); Pueblo Aircraft Service Inc. v. Pueblo, 1982-1 Trade Cas. ~ 64,668, 679 F.2d 805 
(10th Cir. 1982); Euster v. Eagle Downs Racing Ass'n, 1982-2 Trade Cas. ~ 64,734, 677 F.2d 
992 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 388 (1982); Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
Kansas City, 1982-2 Trade Cas. ~ 64,758, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
355. Hallie, 1983-1 Trade Cas. ~ 65,227 (1983). 
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sin, for monopolizing sewage treatment facilities, in response to 
Eau Claire's refusal to supply such services to Hallie. In this case, 
the articulation requirement was met by a Wisconsin statute that 
specifically states, in regard to sewage treatment services, that a 
city ordinance "shall delineate the area within which service will 
be provided and the municipal utility shall have no obligation to 
serve beyond the area so designated."356 In this way, the state 
clearly articulated its acceptance of the exact anticompetitive 
activity at issue.357 Unlike the OWDA authorization statute relied 
on in Hybud, the statute relied on in Eau Claire clearly meets the 
Community Communications clear articulation and express ap-
proval standard. There was no such specific state authorization 
for Akron's monopolization of the city's waste disposal market. 
In the second case relied on by the Hybud court, Pueblo Aircraft 
v. Pueblo,358 a fixed base airline service lease granting an exclu-
sive concession at the airport was put out for competitive bid and 
the losing bidder sued the city for Sherman Act violations.359 In 
Pueblo, the State specifically authorized the city to own and oper-
ate an airport.36o The court went on to note that the state legisla-
ture specifically stated that "such acquisition and operation 'are 
hereby declared to be public governmental functions exercised for 
public purpose and matters of public necessity ... ."361 This 
authorization by the state enabling the city to run the airport as a 
business impliedly authorized the use of a competitive bid proce-
dure to appoint fixed base operators. Unfortunately for Akron, 
there is no similar legislation in Ohio regarding waste recycling 
facilities. 
The third case relied on by the Hybud district court, Euster v. 
Eagle Downs,362 involved a price fixing claim by a jockey who 
claimed that the Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission did not 
have the power to set jockey fees.363 The Horse Racing Commis-
sion was a state commission designed to oversee horse racing364 in 
the same way that a public utilities commission oversees utility 
356. WIS. STAT. § 66.069 (Supp. 1983-84), cited in Hallie at p. 69,338 n.13. 
357. Hallie at p. 69,338. 
358. Pueblo, 1982-1 Trade Cas. ~ 64,668 (1982). 
359. [d. at p. 73,628. 
360. [d. at p. 73,630. 
361. [d. (citing COW. REV. STAT. § 41.4.101 (1973». 
362. Euster, 1982-2 Trade Cas. ~ 6·1,668 (1982). 
363. [d. at p. 71,568. 
364. [d. at p. 71,569. 
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operations. In Euster, the state clearly contemplated the setting 
of jockey fees by the commission. The goal of the legislature in 
setting up the Commission was to vest a supervisory body with 
appropriate powers to control the "previously unlawful activity of 
thoroughbred racing."365 The legislature hoped that the Commis-
sion would use its power to foster public confidence in racing by 
maintaining high legal standards.366 The court went on to find 
that the imposition of a jockey fee schedule was one of the actions 
necessary to accomplish the stated legislative goal.367 The Hybud 
court could point to no such specific powers conferred on the City 
of Akron, nor was there a state administrative body present in 
Ohio with Euster-like powers. 
The last case relied on by the Hybud court, Gold Cross Ambu-
lance v. Kansas City,368 was a suit by a losing bidder for a contract 
to provide ambulance services to Kansas City.369 Gold Cross is 
similar to Eau Claire in that the scheme, in which the successful 
bidder would be the sole provider of ambulance services to Kansas 
City, was specifically authorized by a Missouri statute which 
states that "[a]ny . . . city may provide a general ambulance 
service ... [by] contract with one or more individuals ... for the 
furnishing of emergency treatment."370 Here, the exact 
monopolistic program employed by the city was specifically au-
thorized by the state, as opposed to the Akron situation, where no 
such specific authorization exists. There was no analogous Ohio 
statute which specifically stated that any Ohio municipality could 
establish a waste disposal program to the exclusion of all private 
operators. 
Thus, it appears that Judge Manos' finding of clear articulation 
and affirmative expression of legislative intent was in error, and 
will probably be reversed on appeal. There was no showing that 
the state anticipated and authorized the specific monopolistic 
program employed by Akron. In addition, rather than lending 
support to the city's case, a close examination of the cases relied 
on by the Hybud court demonstrates that the Akron situation is 
distinguishable from those cases in which a clear articulation and 
365. [d. at p. 71,570. 
366. [d. 
367. [d. 
368. Gold Cross, 1982-2 Trade Cas. ~ 64,758 (1982). 
369. [d. at pp. 71,671-72. . ... ~ 
370. [d. at p. 71,676. . (t". "- . l 
\ ~ I..{c'\ 
\).l''- ' 
l~\ ~ 
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affirmative expression have been found. The Parker state action 
exemption, therefore, should not have been granted to Akron by 
the district court on remand. 
Even assuming that the court was right, however, and that 
Akron does pass the first tier of the MidCal test, adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Community Communications, the court still 
erred in dismissing the second tier of the state action test-a 
demonstration of ongoing supervision of the monopolistic activity 
by the state.371 The court dismissed the second tier of the test, 
stating that the active state supervision requirement is not re-
quired when a city is acting in a traditional municipal function.372 
Interestingly, the court based this finding on a Community 
Communications footnote that simply states "because we con-
clude in the present case that Boulder's moratorium does not 
satisfy the 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' crite-
rion, we no not reach the question whether the ordinance must or 
could satisfy the active state supervision test focused upon in 
MidCal."373 In addition, the court relied on Eau Claire374 which 
found that since the state policy was so clearly expressed, addi-
tional state supervision was unnecessary and possibly in appro-
priate.375 Assuming that the Eau Claire court was correct in 
finding that where the state policy is clearly expressed, no ongo-
ing supervision is necessary, this holding is inapplicable to the 
Akron situation. The Wisconsin statute specifically authorized 
the exact actions taken by the City of Eau Claire. In Akron, 
however, where the clear articulation of Eau Claire is lacking, 
there are good reasons to reqUIre active state supervision to 
ensure that the program is carried out fairly and effectively. For 
example, Akron has entered the realm of private for-profit busi-
ness. The unsupervised use of blanket monopoly power by the city 
may give rise to abuses that would give it an unfair advantage 
over its competitors, a situation that did not exist in Eau Claire, 
or for that matter, in any post-Lafayette state action decision.376 
Even if dear and explicit state authorization of the monopolistic 
371. Hybud, 1983-1 Trade Cas. at pp. 71,123-24. 
372. Id. 
373. 455 U.S. at 51-52 & n.14, cited in Hybud, 1983-1 Trade Cas. at p. 70,123. 
374. Hallie, 1983-1 Trade Cas. ~ 65,227 (1983), cited in Hybud, 1983-1 Trade Cas. at pp. 
70,123-24. 
375. Hallie, 1983-1 Trade Cas. at pp. 69,339-40. 
376. See supra text and notes at notes 262-82. 
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activity in question makes active supervision unnecessary, this 
reasoning is inapplicable to the Hybud case, where no such 
explicit state approval exists. Assuming that the OWDA statute 
sufficiently articulates state approval of the Akron plan to pass 
the first tier of the state action test, this approval is so broad and 
vague that the legislature has not really stated what the city can 
and can not do. Thus, the potential for abuse remains and it would 
appear that the MidCal supervision requirement would be appro-
priately applied to Akron. Sipce the OWDA statute does not pro-
vide for any ongoing supervision of the type required by MidCal, 
the Akron regulations would be ineligible for the state action 
exemption because they do not meet second tier of the MidCal 
test. 
VI. THE NEED FOR A LIMITED MUNICIPAL EXEMPTION 
Thus, it appears likely that the district court's most recent 
decision granting the state action exemption from antitrust liabil-
ity to the city of Akron, again on appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, will be reversed. While the court's decision seems to be 
the correct one for practical reasons-the disposal plant was 
necessary and operating at the time of the decision-it is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in MidCal and Com-
munity Communications. Regardless of the outcome of the ap-
peal, the problems raised by municipal vulnerability to antitrust 
liability will remain. Even if the Sixth Circuit finds for the City of 
Akron, municipalities will still be left with, at best, mixed signals 
as to their potential antitrust vulnerability. Whether Akron wins 
of loses, cities in the same position have reason to feel insecure 
about the legality of any programs with monopolistic effects. In 
fact the Akron situation is just one example of a good, useful, and 
necessary program that has run afoul of antitrust prohibitions. 
Cities often find that they need to regulate monopolistically.377 
The areas involved are diverse and include: cable television; land 
377. Monopolistic environmental regulation is often useful or even necessary. For 
example, in Akron, for the Resource Recovery Facility to succeed as a business enter-
prise capable of paying its debts, the facility had to sell the energy it produced. In order 
to maintain contracts with industry whereby the concerns would purchase energy, a 
certain minimum energy output was necessary. See supra note 50. In order to maintain 
this minimum, the city had to be assured of receipt of every available pound of waste. I d. 
To obtain the necessary amount of recyclable waste, the city chose to use a monopolistic 
program to control the solid waste disposal "market." See supra notes 54-58. 
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use and zoning; waste collection and disposal; hospital and ambu-
lance services; water and sewage systems; airport services; utility 
services; towing services; mass transit; licenses and concessions; 
land leasing; and, contracts.378 Monopolistic regulation in these 
areas has given rise to pending antitrust challenges with poten-
tial damages totalling over $746 million.379 
378. See Local Government Antitrust Liability: The Boulder Decision: Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 2d Sess., (1982) (Report of the 
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers Survey on Antitrust, Summary p. 149) 
[hereinafter cited as Judiciary Hearings]. 
379. Id. at 149. This figure includes a number of challenges to environmental programs 
as violative of the antitrust laws. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted the following 
actions: 
Land Use and Zoning 
1. Scott v. City of Sioux City, No. C79-4009 (N.D. la 1979) (damages claimed 
$15,000,000.00). 
Antitrust action brought by disappointed developers seeking a rezoning 
of their property, in order to construct a commercial development. 
2. Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, No. S80-105c (E.D. Mo. 1981) 
(damages claimed $180,000,000.00). 
Suit brought by disgruntled developers denied a change in zoning to 
construct a shopping mall. 
3. Mason City Center v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. la. 1979) 
(damages unspecified). 
Antitrust action alleging that the municipality utilized the zoning laws 
to hinder the development of a shopping center in order to promote 
downtown development. 
4. Miracle Mile v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (damages claimed 
$49,200,000). 
Action brought by developers alleging that the city's petitioning of state 
and federal agencies in order to insure that the developers complied with 
applicable environmental regulations constituted a violation of antitrust 
laws. 
5. Richmond Hilton v. City of Richmond, C.A. No. 81-1100R (E.D. Va. 1980) 
(damages claimed $260,000,000). 
Suits by developers alleging zoning laws were utilized in an anticompeti-
tive manner in order to promote development in a redevelopment area. 
6. Canal Square v. City of Richmond, C.A. No. 81-1115 (E.D. Va. 1981) (dam-
ages unspecified). 
Same facts as above. 
7. Cedars Riverside v. U.S., 459 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd, 606 F.2d 254 
(8th Cir. 1979). 
Action brought challenging actions of redevelopment agency. 
8. Aspen Post v. Board of County Commissioners, No. 81-1400 (D. Colo. 1981) 
(damages claimed $135,000,000.00). 
Suit alleging that various actions taken by municipal officials to limit 
development violated antitrust laws. 
9. Jonnet Development v. City of Pittsburgh, C.A. No. 81-421 (W.D. Pa. 1981), 
appealed to 3rd Cir. Court of Appeals, No. 81-2182. 
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A city's fear of antitrust liability will eventually result in fewer 
services being offered to the citizens of the municipality. Cities 
may decide that the cost of the potential suit in fees and possible 
damages is not worth the benefit to its citizens. For example, if 
full damages had been assessed in Lafayette, the cost would have 
been $540 million or $28 thousand for every family of four in the 
city.380 A city must assess at what point that potential cost is too 
high a price to pay to continue to provide such services. While in 
some cases, the result may merely be a restructuring of municipal 
programs to circumvent the antitrust laws, in other cases, the 
result may be the cancellation of planned or existing service. For 
example, the Akron disposal project could not have been financed 
without implementing the monopolistic regulations because of 
underwriter constraints. 
Antitrust suit brought challenging public acquisition of a property for 
subsequent conveyance to third party in order to promote the redevel-
opment of the downtown area of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Waste Collection and Disposal 
1. Hybud Equipment v. Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981) remanded in light 
of Builder, 455 U.S. 931 (1982). 
Antitrust action brought contesting municipal ownership and operation 
of a waste treatment-energy recycling facility. 
2. Central Iowa Refuse v. Des Moines, No. 79-32-1 (S.D. la.). 
Action brought challenging a municipal cooperative requirement that all 
solid waste be brought to municipal landfill. Suit has delayed for over one 
year construction of municipal landfill. 
Water and Sewage Systems 
1. Community Builders v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1981) (dam-
ages claimed $1,536,000.00). 
Antitrust action brought to challenge hook-up fees for provision of mu-
nicipal water service outside municipal boundaries. 
2. Tuld v. City of Scottsdale and City of Phoenix, 665 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1981) 
($750,000.00). 
Suit brought challenging municipal charges for water hook-up. 
3. Schraderv. Horton, 626 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir.1980), affirming 471 F. Supp.1236 
(W.D. Va. 1979). 
Antitrust' suit challenging compulsory hook-up with municipal water 
system. 
4. Howland Township v. City of Warren, C.A. No. 81-954 (N.D. Oh. 1981) (dam-
ages claimed $1,890,000.00). 
Antitrust action brought challenging a municipal policy of providing 
water only to municipal residents. 
Damages claims are trebles in accordance with antitrust laws. 
Judiciary hearings, supra note 378 at 149. 
380. Id. at 86 (statement by Mayor Corrinne Freeman). Highlighting this issue is 
Richmond Hilton v. Richmond, C.A. No. 81-1100R (E.D. Va. 1980), where the $260 million 
asked for in damages is larger than the city's yearly budget. 
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Cities must be able to plan with greater certainty. They can not 
continue to operate in fear of antitrust challenges, nor can they, 
in good conscience, lower the level of services they provide to the 
public. Thus, the issue presented is, what can be done to provide 
greater protection to municipalities from antitrust liability, while 
maintaining the integrity of the antitrust laws. 
Under the current enunciation of the state action exemption 
test, municipalities would have to request state legislative in-
volvement of the highest order in order to obtain the exemp-
tion.381 The request could take one of two forms. The first is for the 
municipality to voluntarily relinquish to the state legislature all 
authority over local environmental regulation.382 The state pref-
erably by statute, would then have to clearly articulate and 
affirmatively express its desire to establish a program to regulate 
the local hazard.383 Ideally, the program would also provide for 
ongoing supervision by a state authorized agency.384 Thus, each 
city would have to seek, for example, specific state solid waste 
disposal legislation. The legislation, if passed, would probably 
meet the clear articulation requirement, and provide the munici-
pality with state action immunity if active state supervision is 
also present.385 
There are a series of significant problems, however, in requiring 
each state legislature to enact specific legislation authorizing 
each local program. First, continuing with the solid waste exam-
ple, it is probably unrealistic to expect state legislatures to spend 
their time addressing every local solid waste disposal concern. 
Second, any form of state-wide program might not sufficiently 
address the specific problems unique to the local marketplace, 
such as Akron's specialized need for steam generation. Third, 
each legislator would have little interest in legislation which ad-
dresses the problems of just one city, unless the city happens to be 
in his or her district. Thus, generating enough legislative interest 
to even get the legislature to vote on each program may be 
difficult. Fourth, significant staff and personnel additions would 
be necessary to assess each plan, creating a significant increase in 
381. For a discussion of the clear articulation standard, see supra text and notes at 
notes 283-308. 
382. See supra text and notes at notes 283-308. 
383. See supra text and notes at notes 283-308. 
384. See supra text and notes at notes 236-60. 
385. See supra text and notes at notes 262-308. 
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cost. Finally, the passage of the legislation is merely the first step 
as an entirely new bureaucracy, with its consequent costs, would 
have to be created to carry out the required ongoing supervision 
of the regulatory scheme. Therefore, it appears that present-day 
exemption requirements may preclude the use of the state action 
exemption to adequately protect monopolistic environmental 
regulation, even where such regulation is genuinely needed to 
solve pressing municipal problems. 
Monopolistic regulation, however, should remain one of the 
tools in a municipality's regulatory arsenal. Its utility was clearly 
demonstrated in the Akron situation, and the extent to which 
monopolistic regulation is employed in other circumstances.386 
Together with decreasing the amount of litigation flowing from 
such regulation, these trends indicate that the ability of munici-
palities to solve environmental and other problems would in-
crease with a reduction in the risk they face from potential anti-
trust liability. Failure to ease the antitrust burden would result in 
the continued threat of protracted litigation and potential dam-
ages to already strained municipal budgets, and may seriously 
hamper the cities' ability to provide innovative solutions to envi-
ronmental and other problems. At the very least, the courts, as 
did Judge Manos in considering the Hybud case on remand, would 
find themselves forced to distort the antitrust laws to protect vital 
municipal programs. 
VII. PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED STATUTORY EXEMPTION 
Several proposals have been made which would provide to mu-
nicipalities greater protection from antitrust liability. Two par-
ticular proposals demonstrate the polar approaches to this prob-
lem. The first proposal was offered by the National League of 
Cities in testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 
issue of municipal monopolistic regulation.387 The second proposal 
was offered by Justice Rehnquist in his Community Communica-
tions dissent.38s 
The National League of Cities recommended to the Judiciary 
Committee that municipal economic regulation be granted a 
blanket immunity from the antitrust laws.389 The drawbacks of 
386. See supra text and notes at notes 24-59. 
387. Judiciary Hearings, supra note 378, at 17. 
388. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 60-71 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
389. The requirements for such an immunity would be that, "(1) a city would have to 
establish an affirmative policy of substituting regulation or monopoly public service for 
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this approach are significant. A blanket immunity has enormous 
potential for abuse. The potential for abuse would necessitate 
continual judicial monitoring on a case-by-case basis, and the cost 
to a city treasury for this type of antitrust litigation would be a 
significant drain on city revenues.390 The only alternative to liti-
gation would be the creation of monitoring agencies, also at sig-
nificant cost. Also, blanket immunities, unlimited in scope, are 
greatly disfavored by Congress and the courtS.391 Finally, this 
type of immunity is inconsistent with the spirit and scope of the 
Sherman Act as interpreted by the courtS.392 Thus, this proposal, 
beyond being unworkable, would also be unacceptable to the legis-
lature and the judiciary. 
Justice Rehnquist, in his Community Communications dissent, 
proposed maintaining the status quo which would require that the 
courts continue to decide, case by case, whether the antitrust laws 
apply to the challenged actions.393 This approach, however, also 
suffers from significant problems. First, as litigation goes forward 
valuable time in implementing the program is lost. Second, since 
the legality of each program cannot be known until it is tested in 
the courts, the resulting uncertainty would likely hinder progress 
in developing and implementing these plans. Third, due to the 
cost, cities may not be able td afford to litigate every suit. This, in 
turn may give rise to frivolous litigation challenging every munic-
ipal action in the hope that the city will back down and change its 
plans. Fourth, choosing which challenge to litigate may become a 
political decision with consequent special interest problems. Fifth, 
the public's tax dollar can go to better use than the support of the 
competition; (2) the city would have to actively supervise the policy; (3) the city would 
have to act within its authority under state law." Judiciary Hearings, supra note 378, at 
26 (statement of Mayor Tom Moody representing the National League of Cities). 
390. For example some cities live in fear of the legal fees alone and the fact that they 
may bankrupt the city regardless of any damage assessment. Judiciary Hearings, supra 
note 378, at 109 (statement of Harold W. Underhill, Jr., City Attorney, Charlotte, No. 
Carolina). 
391. For a discussion of implied and statutory immunity, see supra text and notes at 
notes 153-78. 
392. As early as 1978, in Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (see supra text and notes at notes 
262-82), this type of municipal immunity was held to be unacceptable. In Lafayette, the 
Court held that: "If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely 
by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a 
serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the 
comprehensive national policy Congress established." [d. at 408. 
393. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 68-69. 
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full time antitrust litigation staffs. Thus, this solution also has 
significant drawbacks. 
The aforementioned approaches are inconsistent with what 
should be the goals of any such system: to limit the possibility for 
abuse; to minimize the addition of new layers of governmental 
involvement; to limit the necessity of using litigation to solve each 
problem; and to minimize cost. There is, however, one alternative 
which would be consistent with all of these goals: a grant of 
statutory immunity attached as an amendment to, for example, 
the Solid Waste Disposal Act.394 
Although it is sometimes the most intrusive form of exemption, 
the explicit statutory exemption395 may be a reasonable compro-
mise solution between the National League of Cities blanket 
exemption proposaP96 and the Rehnquist case-by-case proposa1.397 
An amendment exempting a specific type of municipal environ-
mental program, like the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption of 
the insurance industry,398 could be proposed. As applied to solid 
waste disposal programs, the language might state: 
The antitrust laws including the Sherman Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 
et seq.), Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 et seq.), the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.) and the 
Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 13 et 
seq. 21a) shall not apply to the business of solid waste disposal 
and/or recycling as such programs are regulated by a state or 
municipality. Nothing contained in this act shall render the 
said Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.) inapplicable to any 
agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, 
coercion, or intimidation. 
An immunity written in this way would meet a number of con-
concomitant goals. First, the immunity is limited in its scope and 
thus would be acceptable to Congress and the courtS.399 Second, 
394. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Some commentators have argued 
for blanket statutory immunity covering municipal economic regulation to be attached 
to the Sherman Act. See Judiciary Hearings, supra note 378, at 128 (statement of 
Howard Adler Jr., Esq.). 
395. See supra text and notes at notes 153-66. 
396. See supra text and note at note 389. 
397. See supra text and note at note 388. 
398. The McCarran-Ferguson Act states: "The Sherman Act ... shall not apply to 
business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1976). "Nothing contained in this Act shall 
render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or 
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion or intimidation." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976). 
399. See supra text and notes at notes 167-78. 
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since the immunity is specific, the possibility for wholesale abuse 
is limited.4°O Third, the management of the exemption could be 
carried out by existing personnel.401 Fourth and last, subsequent 
litigation which would define the scope of the exemption, would 
give courts the opportunity to define "waste disposal" in light of 
modern needs and goals.402 
There are, of course, problems with this proposal. Approval by 
Congress of any proposal is always uncertain, regardless of the 
logic behind the legislation. In addition, it is unknown what effect 
lobbying will have on the amendment. Finally, it is unclear how 
the courts will define the business of waste disposal. Even with its 
problems, however, the proposal strikes a reasonable compromise 
between Rehnquist's case-by-case approach and the National 
League of Cities blanket immunity. 
Regardless of the acceptance or rejection of this proposal, any 
resulting discussion must address the fact that the local environ-
mental problems of the present will be the national ones of the 
future. In order to limit the adverse effect of current local prob-
lems on the state or nation as a whole, action should be taken 
today to enable municipalities to address their unique local prob-
lems with creative local solutions. The attitude that these prob-
lems will disappear or can be handled by simple blanket solutions 
has created the current environmental crisis, a crisis we cannot 
afford to ignore. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the late 1960's and early 1970's Akron, Ohio faced a solid 
waste disposal crisis; landfill space was at a premium and new 
400. Id. 
401. Id. 
402. Since the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976), was passed in 
1945, the business of insurance has undergone massive changes. For example, in Group 
Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), the Court noted that: 
"At the time of the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, corporations organized 
for the purpose of providing their members with medical services and hospitalization 
were not considered to be engaged in the insurance business at all ... e.g. Jordan v. 
Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); California Physicians Service v. 
Garrison, 155 P.2d 885 (Cal. App. 1945), aff'd, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946)." 440 U.S. at 
225-27. It is clear today that corporations organized to provide medical services may be in 
the business of insurance and as cases are litigated on this issue, it is important that a 
court be in a position to analyze the exemption issues that arise in light of the needs and 
uses of the times. See generally Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). Just as this ability to 
redefine insurance is important for a consistent and modern application of the 
McCarran-Ferguson exemption, so would it be important to consistent and modern 
application of any exemption applied to municipal monopolistic regulations. 
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laws limited the potential for development of alternative disposal 
sites. The city chose to solve this problem by implementing a 
monopolistic waste disposal plan which required all waste dis-
posal operations to use only a new, city-owned, energy recycling 
facility. 
Private landfill operators responded by filing a number of anti-
trust claims, claiming that Akron had violated sections one and 
two of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act, which prohibits con-
certed actions that are in restraint of trade and any actual or 
attempted monopolization of an industry, applies to individuals 
and corporations, as well as municipalities and states. 
The courts recognize several exemptions from the Act. An ac-
tivity may be protected from the antitrust laws explicitly by 
federal statute; immunity may be implied by a clear repugnancy 
between the Sherman Act and another statute authorizing the 
anticompetitive activity; or the activity may be protected by the 
state action exemption, which exempts activities either per-
formed or directed by the state. Under the current state action 
test, the anticompetitive activity must be clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed by the state. In addition, the activity 
must be supervised by the state in an ongoing fashion. Munici-
palities have access to the state action exemption, but they must 
meet the same standards imposed as those on private entities. 
When the Akron waste disposal regulations were challenged on 
antitrust grounds, the city claimed that it was protected by the 
state action exemption. The district and the circuit courts held for 
Akron, and the landfill operators appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court for a 
decision consistent with the new state action standards de-
lineated in a recent case. The circuit court remanded the case to 
the district court which again upheld the Akron regulations. The 
district court opinion, however, appears to conflict with the Su-
preme Court's state action test, and a reversal seems likely. Re-
gardless of the outcome of the challenge to the Akron litigation, 
again on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the threat of antitrust liabil-
ity undoubtedly has a chilling effect on the often necessary mu-
nicipal use of monopolistic regulation. The creation of an exemp-
tion which could protect programs like Akron's may, therefore, be 
appropriate. 
The exemption should be statutory, and could be offered as an 
amendment to, for example, the Solid Waste Disposal Act. The 
amendment would exempt from antitrust liability municipal anti-
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competitive actions taken to implement a solid waste disposal 
program. This amendment would further the purpose of the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act-to provide federal support to municipal ef-
forts to solve the national waste disposal problem with creative, 
local solutions. The necessity of such an exemption for other 
environmental programs would, of course, have to be examined 
by the Congress. At least in the case of solid waste disposal, 
however, the Akron situation demonstra~es that a statutory 
exemption would have protected an environmentally necessary 
program. In addition, this exemption would have saved a 
financially-strained city the cost of defending its program in at 
least five judicial proceedings, and would protect the integrity of 
the antitrust laws from judges who find it necessary to distort 
antitrust doctrine in order to save needed programs. 
